County Civil Court: CONTRACTS – While it appears that there was an implied
partial waiver of a written estimate, the trial court made insufficient factual
findings to allow proper appellate review.
Case remanded. C. De’s Truck
and Auto, Inc., et al. v. Phillip Slone, No. 2011-AP-000004-ES (Fla. 6th
Cir. App. Ct. June 18, 2012).
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES FOR REHEARING AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY
APPELLATE DIVISION
C. DE’S TRUCK AND AUTO, INC.,
ET AL.,
Appellants,
v. UCN:
512011AP000004XXXXES
Appeal No: 2011-AP-4-ES
L.T.
No: 11-CC-000545
PHILLIP SLONE,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Appeal from Pasco County Court
County
Judge Robert P. Cole
Peter
Wansboro, Esq.
for Appellants
Theresa
I. Wiggington, Esq.
for Appellee
ORDER AND OPINION
Appellant argues that the trial
court erred when it granted Appellee’s writ of replevin and damages based on an
apparent failure to obtain a written estimate for vehicle repairs. While it appears from the record that there
was an implied partial waiver of the written estimate, the trial court made
insufficient factual findings to allow proper appellate review. Therefore, this court remands this cause as
set forth below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At a
June 16, 2011 hearing, the following testimony was presented: Appellants, Vincent and Cherylann
Dehart, are the owners of C. De’s Auto and had performed repairs on Appellee’s
vehicles thirty to sixty times since about 2005. On or about October 8, 2010, a mechanic for
C. De’s locked up the property for the night.
When the mechanic returned at 8:30 the next morning, Appellee’s 1997
Ford F-150 truck had been left. Mr.
Dehart contacted Appellee, but he could not give an estimate on what it would
take to make the truck run again without taking it apart first. Mr. Dehart provided a rough estimate of
$2,500 to $2,700. Appellee or Appellee’s
son gave him two deposits of $1,250 and $500.
Mr. Dehart was never asked for a written estimate for the repairs and
did not present Appellee in advance of doing any work with a written
estimate. Mr. Dehart, however, gave two
work orders (labeled “invoice”), on October 26, 2010, which were produced as a
work-up order to keep track of the repairs.
Appellee
periodically came to the repair shop after the truck was dropped off. Appellee never asked for an estimate for the
truck, and Mr. Dehart never provided any estimate of either the diagnostic work
or repairs. At one point, Appellee took
the truck for about an hour and filled it with gas. Upon his return, Mr. Dehart showed Appellee
the issues the truck was still having.
Sometime in December 2010, Mr. Dehart gave Appellee’s son one of the
work orders after the repairs were already completed.
After
the repairs were completed, Appellee sent an employee to pick up the
truck. Ms. Dehart called Appellee to
find out whether Appellee would pay if they let the employee take the truck
that Saturday. Appellee responded that
if that is what they thought of him, to forget it, and he would be in on
Wednesday to pick up the truck. Ms.
Dehart tried to call Appellee back three times since he had been a customer for
five or six years and to tell him it would be okay to pick up the truck that
day, but Appellee would not answer the phone.
Appellee returned about a week and a half later. Apparently, Mr. Dehart demanded immediate
payment or he would place a lien on the truck and sell it, which prompted the
filing of the writ of replevin.
On
February 8, 2011, Appellee filed a Demand for Hearing and Verified Petition for
Prejudgment Writ of Replevin and Complaint for Damages. At the end of the June 16, 2011 hearing, the
Honorable Robert P. Cole ruled for Appellee and stated that he would issue the
writ of replevin. In the July 14, 2011
final order on writ of replevin, the trial court found that Appellants operated
a motor vehicle repair facility, which was regulated under Florida Statute 559,
Part IX. The trial court further found
that Appellee took his vehicle to Appellants’ repair facility, the cost of the
repairs exceeded $100.00, and Appellee paid Appellants $1,750.00 as a down
payment for the repairs. Appellants were
ordered to immediately relinquish possession of the truck and return $1,750.00
minus $50.00 allowed by statute. On July
25, 2011, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, of which the trial
court appears to have never ruled. Appellants
filed a timely notice of appeal on August 12, 2011.
LAW
AND ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that the trial court
erred when it granted Appellee’s writ of replevin based on a failure to obtain
a written estimate for the repairs performed.
Since the testimony appears uncontroverted that Appellee left his truck
at Appellants’ repair shop after hours, there would be an implied partial
waiver of the written estimate under Florida Statute 559.905(5):
If the customer leaves
her or his motor vehicle at a motor vehicle repair shop during hours when the
shop is not open or if the customer permits the shop or another person to
deliver the motor vehicle to the shop, there shall be an implied partial waiver
of the written estimate; however, upon completion of diagnostic work necessary
to estimate the cost of repair, the shop shall notify the customer as required
in s. 559.909(1).
As such, Appellants would have been required to notify
Appellee in accordance to Florida Statute 559.909(1)(c),
which provides:
An implied partial
waiver exists for diagnostic work, as described in s. 559.905(5), and such
diagnostic work has been completed, the customer shall be promptly notified by
telephone, telegraph, mail, or other means of the additional repair work and
estimated cost thereof. A customer so
notified shall, orally or in writing, authorize, modify, or cancel the order
for repair.
While this court reviews the trial court’s statutory
interpretation de novo, this court
must defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by
competent, substantial evidence from the record. McDougall v. Culver, 3 So. 3d 391, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2009). The trial court, however, made insufficient
factual findings to allow proper appellate review.
On remand, the court should make
specific factual findings with respect to Florida Statutes 559.905(5) and
559.909(1)(c). The
trial court shall make a specific finding as to whether there was an implied
partial waiver of the written estimate under §559.905(5) by Appellee leaving
his truck after hours or having another deliver the truck to the repair shop,
and if so, whether Appellee was promptly notified by telephone, telegraph,
mail, or other means of the estimated repair work pursuant to §559.909(1)(c). And if that be
the finding, then the trial court shall make a factual finding as to whether
Appellee orally or in writing authorized, modified, or canceled the order for
repair. Finally, the trial court shall
rule upon any pending motions for reconsideration. It is therefore,
ORDERED that this cause is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for
action consistent with this order and opinion.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at New
Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida this 18th day of June 2012.
Original order entered on June 18, 2012
by Circuit Judges Stanley R. Mills, W. Lowell Bray, Jr., and Patricia A.
Muscarella.