County
Small Claims Court: CIVIL PROCEDURE — Motion for
Continuance – Although the appellate record was insufficient, it is highly
unlikely that Appellant could have demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Appellee’s motion for continuance. Granting of motion for
continuance and motion to stay proceeding affirmed. Jack Petrosky v. Donnie C. Johnson,
No. 2010-AP-000012-WS (Fla. 6th Cir. App. Ct. August 9, 2011).
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES FOR REHEARING AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY
APPELLATE DIVISION
JACK PETROSKY,
Appellant,
UCN: 512010AP000012XXXXWS
v. Case
No: 10-AP-000012-WS
Lower
No: 08-SC-5226-WS
DONNIE C. JOHNSON,
Appellee.
______________________________/
Appeal
from Pasco County Court
County
Judge Candy Morris VanDercar and
County
Judge Paul E. Firmani
Ramy N. Fares, Esq.,
For Appellant
Donnie
C. Johnson,
Appellee
ORDER AND OPINION
Appellant
argues that the trial court reversibly erred by granting Appellee’s Motion for
Continuance and Motion to Stay Proceeding.
Although the appellate record was insufficient, it is highly unlikely
that Appellant could have demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court’s decisions as set forth below.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
On December
16, 2008, Appellee (Donnie Johnson) filed a small claims action against
Appellant (Jack Petrosky), alleging that Appellant
set in motion a Wal-Mart shopping cart, which collided with Appellee’s vehicle,
causing damage to his 2004 Ford Mustang.
The pre-trial conference was scheduled for January 20, 2009, and the
trial was scheduled for March 17, 2009 by Judge VanDercar. On the March 17, 2009 trial date, Appellee
did not appear. Although a transcript was
not included in the appellate record, Appellant alleges that Appellee’s mother
was present and orally requested a continuance because Appellee’s father was
also not present. The trial court
granted the requested continuance.
A
new trial date was set for May 5, 2009.
Again, a transcript was not provided, but Appellant alleges that neither
Appellee nor his father appeared.
Instead, Appellee’s mother was present and orally requested another
continuance due to Appellee’s military deployment. The matter was ostensibly taken under
advisement, and the request for stay was granted on June 9, 2009 by Judge VanDercar. In the
Order to Set Aside Hearing Due to Military Activity Duty Overseas, it indicated
that Appellee was serving full active duty overseas and would not return until
2010 and that the order would be in effect until September 30, 2010. On August 12, 2009, Appellant sent
correspondence to Judge VanDercar, arguing that a
stay was not warranted.
On
March 3, 2010, Appellee filed a copy of his orders indicating that he would be
released from active duty on February 28, 2010.
On May 3, 2010, Appellee filed a Notice of Final Hearing, explaining
that he served overseas from February 14, 2009 until February 28, 2010, and
requested a final hearing. The trial was rescheduled for July 23, 2010, after
which Judge Firmani entered a Final Judgment against Appellant on July 29,
2010. Appellant filed a timely Notice of
Appeal on August 27, 2010.
LAW
AND ANALYSIS
Appellant
argues that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to continue and
motion to stay proceedings in lieu of dismissing the case or proceeding to
trial on the merits. On appeal, a trial
court’s decision is presumed correct.
Appellant has the burden of overcoming this presumption by demonstrating
reversible error. State
v. Blanco, 896 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Appellant has not provided a transcript or an
appropriate substitute of the trial court hearings. Where a transcript or proper substitute is
not included in the appellate record, the trial court’s order must be upheld
unless fundamental error is shown on its face.
Hoirup v. Hoirup,
862 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The most significant obstacle to meaningful
review of a trial court’s decision is the lack of a transcript. Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007).
Even
had a transcript been provided, it is highly unlikely that Appellant could have
demonstrated reversible error. Granting
a continuance is within the trial court's discretion, and the court's ruling on
a motion for continuance will be reversed only when an abuse of discretion is
shown. Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 2009); Lebron v.
State, 799 So. 2d 997, 1018 (Fla. 2001). In this case, it does not appear that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellee’s motions to continue.
Florida
Small Claims Rule 7.130 indicates that a continuance “may be granted only upon
good cause shown. The motion for continuance may be oral, but the court may
require that it be reduced to writing. The action shall be set again for trial
as soon as practicable and the parties shall be given timely notice.” Taking Appellant’s statement that Appellee’s
mother was the only person present and the one requesting a continuance on her
son’s behalf due to his military deployment as true, since a transcript is
lacking, Appellant still has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting the continuance requests. The trial court’s order stated that further
hearings would not be heard until Appellee returned from serving full active
duty overseas, as he was exercising his right to serve in the military. A trial court's decision does not constitute
an abuse of discretion "unless no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court." Scott
v. State, 717 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. 1998). Granting a continuance to a party on military
deployment does not reasonably constitute an abuse of discretion.
Appellant
further argues that the case should have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 7.160. Rule 7.160(a) states that if a plaintiff
fails to appear at the pretrial conference or fails to appear at trial “the
action may be dismissed for want of prosecution, defendant may proceed to trial
on the merits, or the action may be continued as the judge may direct.” Appellant contends that since Appellee did
not appear, the case should have been tried or dismissed. It is discretionary, however, whether or not
the trial court chooses to proceed, continue, or dismiss the case. It should also be noted that no motion to
dismiss appears to have ever been presented to the trial court. Even had such a motion been presented, Appellant
has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by not
dismissing the case under this rule. Rule
7.160(b) further provides, “If both parties fail to appear, the judge may
continue the action or dismiss it for want of prosecution at that time or later
as justice requires.” Both parties did
not fail to appear at either pretrial conference; thus, this section does not
apply as Appellant suggests. Even so,
subsection (b) is likewise discretionary, allowing the trial court the option
to either continue or dismiss the case.
Finally, Appellant argues that the
trial court improperly granted Appellee’s request to stay the case until 2010
under 50 USCS Appx § 522. Subsection (b)(1) provides that at any stage
before final judgment in a civil action in which a service member is a party,
“the court may on its own motion and shall, upon application by the servicemember, stay the action for a period of not less
than 90 days,” if the following conditions under subsection (b)(2) are met:
(A) A letter or other communication setting forth facts stating the
manner in which current military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember's ability to appear and stating a date when
the servicemember will be available to appear.
(B) A letter or other communication from the servicemember's
commanding officer stating that the servicemember's
current military duty prevents appearance and that military leave is not
authorized for the servicemember at the time of the
letter.
Both conditions were met by Appellee. Appellee communicated when his deployment
would inhibit him from appearing and when he would be available to appear
through his mother and his drafted request titled “Order to Set Aside Hearing
Due to Military Active Duty Overseas.”
The record also contains a written communication as directed by
subsection (b)(2).
Even had the requirements not been met under 50 USCS Appx
§ 522, it was unnecessary since granting a continuance was within the trial
court’s discretion.
Given
the state of the record, Appellant cannot establish reversible error. Even had a transcript been provided, it is truly
doubtful that Appellant could have shown that the trial court abused its
discretion. It is therefore,
ORDERED that the
trial court’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers, at New Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida this 9th
day of August 2011.
Original
order entered on August 9, 2011 by Circuit Judges Stanley R. Mills, W. Lowell
Bray, Jr., and Daniel D. Diskey.