County
Criminal Court: CRIMINAL LAW — Jury
Trial — Evidence — The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting statements made by Appellant to law enforcement.
Trial court’s order denying motion in limine
affirmed. Hector Antonio Guzman v. State of Florida, No. CRC10-006828-CFAWS (Fla. 6th Cir. App. Ct. July 27, 2011).
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES FOR REHEARING AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY
APPELLATE DIVISION
HECTOR ANTONIO GUZMAN,
Appellant,
UCN: 512010CF006828A000WS
v. Case
No: CRC10-06828-CFAWS
Lower
No: CTC1003535MMAWS-16
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Appeal from Pasco County Court
County
Judge Marc H. Salton
Simone
Lennon, Esq.
for Appellant
Joel D.
Fritton, A.S.A.
for Appellee
ORDER AND OPINION
The
trial court denied Appellant’s motion in limine
seeking to exclude statements made by Appellant to law enforcement at the time
of his refusal to submit to breath testing. Appellant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by allowing the State to admit the prejudicial and irrelevant
testimony. We find that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. Therefore,
this court affirms the trial court’s order as set forth below.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
On June
24, 2010, Appellant was charged with (1) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia,
contrary to § 893.147(1)(b); (2) Possession of Marijuana, contrary to §
893.13(6)(b); (3) Driving Under the Influence, contrary to § 316.193(1); (4) Refusal
to Submit to Testing, contrary to § 316.1932; and (5) Driving While License
Suspended or Revoked, contrary to § 322.34(2)(b). All these first degree misdemeanors occurred
on May 15, 2010.
Prior
to trial, Appellant presented a motion in limine
seeking to exclude statements made by Appellant to law enforcement at the time
of his refusal to submit to breath testing. Specifically, the defense sought to exclude
Appellant’s statements to Deputy Orndorff to “suck my
dick” and “I ain’t blowing into shit.” The defense argued that these statements were
inflammatory, made in anger, and would lower the State’s burden. The State responded that anger does not make
a statement inadmissible into evidence.
The statements went to a direct element of Appellant’s charge of
refusing to submit to a breath test. The
statements were needed to prove that Appellant was asked to submit, but he refused. Since it went to a direct element of the
crime of refusing to submit, the State argued it had a right to put the
statements into evidence. The State
furthered that any probative value was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice because it went to a material element of the crime.
The
trial court noted that the statements also went to the fact that one may argue
that a sober person would not say such things.
When the defense argued that the statements were prejudicial, the trial
court responded that, while they may be prejudicial to Appellant, it does not
make them inadmissible. The trial court furthered
that the fact that he would say that to an officer, the State could reasonably
argue that it is just another factor within the totality of the circumstances
that shows that he was impaired. The
trial court found that the probative value outweighed any prejudice to Appellant
and denied Appellant’s motion in limine.
At
the September 15, 2010 trial, Deputy William Orndorff testified that he conducted a DUI
investigation a little after two o’clock in the morning, on May 15, 2010. He was driving north on U.S. 19 coming up to
Darlington when he saw a car come to a complete stop at a yellow flashing
light. There were about five to six cars
that all had to slam on their brakes.
One car almost was rear-ended. A
couple of seconds later, the car accelerated at a high rate of speed. The car was in the middle northbound lane and
was swerving into the left and right lanes.
Deputy Orndorff caught up with Appellant at U.S.
19 and Moog, which was more than a mile away.
He stopped Appellant in the middle of the left turn lane at the
intersection.
When
Deputy Orndorff approached Appellant’s car, he was
sitting in the driver’s seat, tightly gripping the steering wheel with both
hands, and just staring forward blankly.
Appellant’s speech was so slurred that it was hard to understand
him. Appellant said he was coming from
Hammer Heads in Holiday and heading to his father’s house in Holiday Lake
Estates. Deputy Orndorff
testified that Appellant went the wrong direction when he left the bar and had
already passed Holiday Lake Estates by more than two miles. Appellant said he had one Jack and Coke at
Hammer Heads. He had a strong smell of
alcohol. Deputy Orndorff
could smell it when Appellant was staring forward and gripping the steering
wheel, even before Appellant turned to face him. The traffic stop was conducted at 2:08 in the
morning, just after the bars close in Pasco County.
Deputy
Orndorff began to conduct a DUI investigation. He asked Appellant if he would step out of
the vehicle and he agreed. Appellant’s
coordination when he stepped out was not good.
Appellant was fumbling with the door handle to get out and he got pretty
upset. When Appellant first stepped out
of the car, he was standing in a wide stance and swaying. Once the traffic cleared, they walked across
U.S. 19 into the Burger King parking lot.
Appellant’s balance was not good as they walked. He was pretty unsteady on his feet, and
Appellant was swaying although there was no breeze.
When
asking Appellant questions, Deputy Orndorff had to
repeat himself several times. He had asked
Appellant for his driver’s license, and Appellant kept looking through his
wallet, but could not find it after looking for at least a minute. Then when Deputy Orndorff
finally asked whether he had a driver’s license, Appellant admitted that he did
not. Appellant said that it was
suspended for tickets, which Deputy Orndorff later
confirmed. Appellant could also not
produce his registration or insurance. Appellant
was agitated and belligerent. Deputy Orndorff could tell that Appellant was intoxicated.
Deputy
Orndorff requested Appellant to perform field
sobriety exercises: walk and turn, one-leg stand, and finger-to-nose. On the walk and turn test, Appellant stepped
off the line three times on the second set of steps. He only took eight steps both times. Appellant turned to the right instead of the
left. He also raised his arms at one
point during the first set of steps.
Appellant was not able to keep balance during the instructions. Appellant did not touch his heel to toe on
every single step by at least two to three inches. On the one-leg stand, Appellant did not count
to 30 out loud, he only reached seven.
Appellant put his foot down on six, lifted it back up, continued
counting to seven, put his foot down, lifted it back up, then he stopped
counting out loud. Before the 30 seconds
was up, Appellant put his foot down four more times. Appellant swayed and used his arms to
balance, which were more signs of impairment.
On the finger-to-nose test, Appellant’s eyes did not remain closed
throughout this test as instructed.
Appellant did not touch the tip of his nose; he missed all six times. Based on all his training and experience as a
STEP officer, Appellant performed poorly on the field sobriety exercises.
Deputy
Orndorff,
placed Appellant under arrest for DUI.
Appellant agreed to the requested breath test at Burger King, but
changed his mind once they got to the jail.
When asked to submit to the breath test at the jail, Appellant did not specifically
say no; he said, “I ain’t blowing into shit.” Appellant objected based on the grounds
argued in their motion in limine, which was overruled. Deputy Orndorff read
implied consent, informing Appellant that if he refused to submit to a lawful
sample of his breath that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be
suspended one year, or 18 months if this was a second refusal, and that would
be committing a misdemeanor. Appellant
still would not agree to perform the breath test. Instead, Appellant said, “Suck my dick.” Appellant’s prior driving record indicated
that Appellant had a prior refusal to submit to a breath test on July 30, 2005
in Hillsborough County.
The
car Appellant was driving was registered to his wife, but she could not come
and get it from Tampa with the kids sleeping.
Appellant was alone and was the only one in control over the vehicle. Deputy Orndroff had
to have the car towed and impounded.
When the car was inventoried for impoundment, Deputy Orndorff
found a marijuana pipe and a little baggie of marijuana together in the left
corner of the trunk on top of a pile of clothes. He field tested it for marijuana, which came
back positive. The burnt ash in the pipe
also field tested positive. Both items
were entered into evidence without objection.
After
the State rested, the defense renewed his motions and objections and requested
a mistrial for allowing the statements to be entered by the deputy, which was
denied. The defense moved for a judgment
of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove that Appellant was under
the influence or that he was in actual possession of the marijuana, which was
also denied.
Appellant
testified that earlier that day, they were having a family get together at his
father’s house in Holiday. Appellant’s
younger brother Carlos left the picnic abruptly, and disappeared. Soon thereafter, the police showed up at the
house looking for his brother. Appellant
believed that his brother was planning on committing suicide, which made
Appellant upset. The police asked
Appellant if he was Carlos, and he told them he was not. Appellant told the police that he did not
know where he was. Another officer went
to the back and questioned the kids in the pool. Appellant’s father came to the door and took
over talking to the police. Appellant
called Carlos on the phone, and he seemed okay.
Appellant asked him why the police were looking for him, and he simply
responded that he did not do anything.
Appellant still does not know why the police were looking for his
brother. His brother called him a couple
hours later while he was still at the family get together. The phone call was very short and
abrupt. Appellant went looking for his
younger brother with his adopted brother Curtis. It was uncommon for his younger brother to
act that way, but his brother seemed to get easily agitated, his temper would
flair for seemingly little reasons, and would often overreact since his return
from Iraq.
Appellant
claimed that he drove that evening because he could not find Curtis, who was
somewhere in the bar, and he needed to go look for Carlos. Appellant did not believe that he had another
alternative to driving. Appellant did
not take a cab because he received information that his brother possibly had a
gun. Appellant made the abrupt stop at
the light because he was looking for his brother. Appellant thought his brother was walking on
foot. His brother used to live on
Darlington, but had recently been evicted.
Appellant thought he may be in that area. Appellant was looking around the Walgreen’s parking
lot area on Darlington when he looked up and saw that the light was yellow, so
he stopped. Appellant denied speeding
off. Appellant changed lanes after he
did not see his brother on the Darlington area, thinking that his brother may
be in the apartments behind McDonalds.
Appellant
admitted he was angry that he got pulled over.
He was in the process of looking for his brother, and that stopped
everything. Appellant explained to the
officer that he was looking for his brother and then going home. Appellant did not explain to the officer why
he was looking for his brother because he did not want to put his brother in
danger. Appellant admitted that his
driver’s license was suspended.
Appellant explained that he was upset and reacting to the officer’s
attitude and demeanor when he made the two derogatory comments at the jail.
On
cross-examination, Appellant stated that he did not hear the part about if he
had a prior refusal to submit to a breath test, he would be charged with a
crime. Appellant did hear the deputy ask
him a second time to submit to a breath test.
Appellant admitted that he said, “I ain’t
blowing into shit” on the first request and then “suck my dick” upon the second
request.
After
the defense rested, the State recalled Deputy Orndorff. Deputy Orndorff
testified that Appellant said nothing about his brother or any other family
members throughout his investigation.
The
defense renewed its motion for judgment of acquittal, but added that the
defense had proven the theory of necessity.
Appellant had also shown through his testimony that the marijuana and
paraphernalia did not belong to Appellant.
Appellant’s motion was denied. The
jury found Appellant guilty as charged to all counts. Appellant was sentenced the same day to 140 days
county jail, followed by one year of probation.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial
court committed reversible error by allowing the State to admit prejudicial and
irrelevant testimony. Florida Statute
90.403 provides that relevant evidence is inadmissible “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” A trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether the probative value of evidence sought to be
admitted is substantially outweighed by any of the reasons enumerated in Florida
Statute 90.403. See, Lewis v. State, 570 So. 2d 412, 415
(Fla. 1990). When a trial court
has weighed the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, the
decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Lewis, at 415.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
the State to admit the statements made by Appellant to Deputy Orndorff.
Florida
Statute 90.401 states that relevant evidence is “evidence tending to prove or
disprove a material fact.” The State was
required to prove that Appellant refused to submit to the breath test, pursuant
to Florida Statute 316.1939(1)(e). Appellant’s statements could easily be taken
as a refusal. Thus, the statements were
clearly relevant.
Considering
unfair prejudice balanced against probative value, nothing could be more
probative of whether Appellant refused to submit to testing than his own
statement of refusal. As such, the
prejudicial effect—of which all relevant evidence seems to possess—is not only
less, but substantially less. It cannot
be reasonably asserted that because Appellant chose to respond in a vulgar manner
that jurors may have come to their decision based on emotion. The jury could certainly have based their
guilty verdict on Appellant’s own admission that he refused to submit to
testing, his own admission that he was read implied consent, and his own admission
that he had previously refused to submit to testing. Any error, if any, was harmless.
Appellant
cites Carillo v. State, 727 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which is not
on point. In that case, the trial
court was found to have erred by allowing the admission of a prejudicial
statement by the defendant, who was convicted of aggravated assault after
raising a chair over his head in a domestic dispute with his girlfriend. Over defense objection, the State introduced
the testimony that the defendant told the arresting officer that he was “not
going to jail for that bitch.” Id., at 1047-8.
When he was placed inside the police car, he banged his head on the side
of the car, stamped his feet, and yelled, “If I’m going to jail for this bitch,
I might as well kill her.” Id. at 1048.
In concluding that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence, the
Second District noted that the State’s case was not strong and that the
comments may well have made the difference between acquittal and conviction. Id., at 1048. Unlike the instant case, in Carillo, the defendant’s statement was not a direct
element of the crime and was made over an hour after the assault. As such, it properly failed the balancing
test. Here Appellant’s statement went to
a direct element of the crime of refusal to submit to testing and was not remote. Carillo is
also distinguishable because the State’s case was not strong, as it was in this
case. Appellant’s reliance on Carillo is misplaced.
The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Appellant’s statements. The statements were relevant and its
probative value substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. Appellant’s convictions and sentences should
be affirmed.
It is therefore,
ORDERED that the trial court’s order
denying Appellant’s motion in limine is hereby AFFIRMED.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers, at New Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida this 27th
day of July 2011.
Original
order entered on July 27, 2011 by Circuit Judges Stanley R. Mills, W. Lowell
Bray, Jr., and Daniel D. Diskey.