Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Quasi-Judicial Action, Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles: DRIVER’S LICENSES – Implied Consent –
Confusion Doctrine – Beyer’s argument that she was confused by having two
rights read together, Miranda and implied consent, must fail – driver never
made her confusion known to the officer so that officer could have an
opportunity to provide further explanation - Petition denied. Beyer
v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, No. 05-0017AP-88A (
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND
APPELLATE DIVISION
KATHY BEYER,
Petitioner,
vs. Appeal No. 05-0017AP-88A
UCN522005AP000017XXXXCV
STATE OF
HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
THIS CAUSE came before
the Court on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Response, and the Reply. Upon consideration
of the same, the record and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that
the Petition must be denied as set forth below.
The
Petitioner, Kathy Beyer (Beyer), seeks review of the Final Order of License
Suspension, entered February 3, 2005, in which the hearing officer for the
Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department),
concluded that Beyer’s driving privilege was properly suspended for a period of
one year for driving under the influence (DUI).
In reviewing the Final Order and the administrative action taken by the
Department, this Court must determine whether Beyer was afforded procedural due
process, whether the essential requirements of law were observed, and whether
the Department’s findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial
evidence. See Vichich v.
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 799 So.2d 1069, 1073 (
The record shows that on October 15, 2004, at approximately 8:33 p.m., Officer Harris, of the Clearwater Police Department, observed a vehicle driving northbound in a southbound lane causing several vehicles to move over to avoid a collision. Officer Harris conducted a traffic stop and approached the driver, identified as Beyer. Officer Harris observed that Beyer’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, and that the odor of alcohol emanated from Beyer’s breath. Officer Harris asked Beyer how much she had to drink and Beyer responded “not much at all.” Officer Miller arrived as back-up at the same time as Beyer’s husband. Beyer’s husband was on the phone and immediately informed his wife not to perform any “tests.” As stated by Officer Harris in her arrest narrative, “Beyer was having a hard time making a decision as to whether or not she was going to perform the tasks.” Beyer eventually made the decision to perform the field sobriety tests and performed poorly. Beyer was placed under arrest for DUI.
Officer Harris asked Beyer if she would take a breath test and informed her of the implied consent law. Officer Harris then read Beyer the Miranda warnings and transported her to the breath testing facility. After the 20-minute observation period, Officer Harris asked Beyer if she planned to take the test to which Beyer responded “she didn’t know what she was going to do.” Officer Harris informed Beyer that it was her last opportunity to take the breath test. Beyer asked if her license would be suspended for one year to which Officer Harris told her it would if she refused the breath test. Beyer then stated she wasn’t taking the breath test.
At the hearing, Beyer testified that she believed her statement that she would not take the breath test could not be used against her because she invoked her right to remain silent. Beyer further testified that Officer Harris did not explain that her response to the request to take the breath test is an exception to invoking her Miranda right to remain silent. Upon considering the documents generated at the time of Beyer’s arrest and the testimony of Beyer, the hearing officer concluded that Beyer refused to submit to a breath test.
Beyer
argues that the Department failed to follow the law and afford Beyer due
process in finding that Beyer unlawfully refused to submit to a breath
test. Beyer’s argument is premised on
the “confusion doctrine.” This doctrine
holds that a licensee’s refusal to submit to a breath test will be excused if
the licensee is confused by having two rights read together, Miranda rights and
the implied consent law, and the officer does not inform the suspect that
Miranda rights do not apply to the decision of whether to take the breath
test. See Wright v.
Beyer
cites to the county court decision of State v. Alves, 3
The Court finds that even if Alves were binding on this Court, there is no evidence in the record that Beyer exercised her right to remain silent. After being read Miranda, Beyer continued to talk to Officer Harris, asking several times when she would be able to get out of jail and whether she could use the phone at the jail. Further, this Court agrees with the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, that “[i]f, after receiving the implied consent warning, the licensee is still confused about the applicability of Miranda rights to the decision to take a breath test, the licensee should make that confusion known to law enforcement, so that law enforcement is aware that further explanation is necessary.” See Ringel, supra. While Beyer testified that she believed her post-Miranda statements could not be used against her, Beyer did not testify, nor does the record indicate, that Beyer made her confusion known to Officer Harris.
Accordingly,
the Court finds that the hearing officer’s conclusion that Beyer unlawfully
refused to submit to the breath test is supported by competent substantial
evidence. The Court cannot reweigh the evidence
to arrive at a different conclusion. See
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Satter, 643 So.2d
692, 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)(concluding that the hearing officer, as trier of
fact, was in the best position to evaluate the evidence and witnesses); see
also Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Favino, 667
So.2d 305, 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(same).
Therefore, it is,
ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is denied.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers, at
_______________________________
JOHN A. SCHAEFER
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
_______________________________ ______________________________
LAUREN C. LAUGHLIN JAMES R. CASE
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
Copies furnished to:
J. Kevin Hayslett, Esquire
Carlos J. Raurell, Assistant General Counsel
Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
Bureau of Administrative Reviews