County Criminal Court: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – Dismissal – Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d) provides that a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to 3.190 c (4), shall be denied upon the filing by the state of a traverse which denies material facts- state filed a traverse in which the state not only denied material facts but also added additional facts-error to grant motion to dismiss- Judgment reversed-State v. Sengstock, No. 03-2219CFAES(Fla. 6th App. Ct. November 15, 2004).
IN
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF
THE STATE OF
APPELLATE
DIVISION
STATE OF
Appellant,
vs. Appeal
No: 032219CFAES
Lower
Ct: CTC 02-05093MMAWS17
MICHAEL SENGSTOCK,
Appellee.
____________________________/
Opinion filed _________________________.
Appeal from an order in Pasco County Court
County Judge Seaver
Eric J. Herrmann
Office of the State Attorney
David E. Olson, Esq.
ORDER AND OPINION
This
matter came before the court on the State of
On July 31, 2002, Deputy Housel of the Pasco County Sheriff's Office was dispatched to the defendant's residence, in response to a criminal mischief complaint and possible neighbor dispute. According to the arrest report, the officer observed defendant in the road yelling and screaming. He advised defendant to stop screaming and to go back into his home. Defendant refused and continued screaming in the middle of the road. Two separate witnesses advised the officer that defendant's action were disturbing their peace and tranquility. Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P., Rule 3.190 (a) (b)(c) and (c)4, in which he argued he was not screaming and yelling and that he had witnesses for the defense that would testify to that effect. Defendant argued, in the alternative, even if defendant was screaming and yelling, the conduct did not violate any laws and was well within the defendant's constitutional rights. The motion was supported by two affidavits.[1] The state filed a traverse in which it alleged that the deputy along with three other witnesses observed defendant's yelling and were disturbed by defendant's behavior. The state further alleged that some of the neighbors were awakened by the defendant's actions. Additionally, the traverse alleged that neither of the two defense witnesses who submitted affidavits to support the motion to dismiss were present during the incident, and neither made any reports to the deputy who was dispatched to the location. With regard to whether or not the actions amounted to 'disorderly conduct', the state argued that the constitutionality of the statute is a question of law which is not appropriately asserted in a motion to dismiss. Finally, the state asserted that it had witness testimony and evidence to support the charges of disorderly conduct.
The
trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss. This was error. Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.190(d) provides that a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to 3.190 c
(4), shall
be denied upon the filing by the state of a traverse which denies material
facts. (Emphasis added). In this case,
the state filed a traverse in which the state not only denied material facts but
also added additional facts, i.e., that
the deputy and other witnesses observed defendant's yelling and that some of
the neighbors were awakened by defendant's actions. Additionally, the traverse alleged that two
of the defense witnesses who provided affidavits were not even present during
the incident nor made any reports to the deputy. See State
v. Kalogeropolous, 758 So. 2d 110 (
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment be REVERSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at New
Port Richey,
day of November, 2004.
________________________
Primary Appellate Judge
_____________________
Daniel D. Diskey
Circuit Judge
______________________
Circuit Judge
Eric J. Herrmann
Office of the State Attorney
David E. Olson, Esq.
[1] A review
of the jurat in defendant's Motion to Dismiss reveals that it is procedurally
defective as defendant simply recited
that the facts contained in the motion were true and correct "to the best
of his knowledge." Such an oath is
ineffective, and, therefore, the motion was insufficient. State v. Rodriguez 523 So.2d
1141 (