Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to Review Quasi-Judicial Action, Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles: DRIVER’S LICENSES – Traffic Stop – although
officer did not get a tag number and was unable to identify driver, record
supports finding that vehicle stopped was the same one observed speeding through
intersection a short time before -- Petition denied. Meisman v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles, No. 04-0004AP-88A (
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND
APPELLATE DIVISION
TRAVIS GRANT MEISMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
Appeal No. 04-000004AP-88A
UCN522004AP000004XXXXCV
STATE OF
HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,
DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSES,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
THIS CAUSE came before
the Court on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Response and the Reply.
Upon consideration of the same, the record
and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that the Petition must
be denied as set forth below.
The Petitioner, Travis Grant Meisman (Meisman), seeks review of the
Final Order of License Suspension, entered December 13, 2003, in which the
hearing officer for the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles (Department), concluded that Meisman’s driving privilege was properly
suspended for a period of six months for driving under the influence (DUI).
In reviewing the Department’s order, this Court
must determine (1) whether procedural due process had been accorded, (2) whether
the essential requirements of law had been observed, and (3) whether the administrative
findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence.
See Vichich v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
799 So.2d 1069, 1073 (
The record shows that on August 12,
2003, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Osarczuk and Officer Brockew, of
the Tarpon Springs Police Department, were on a traffic stop of another vehicle
when they heard a loud sound of an engine accelerating. Officer Brockew testified that it “sounded like
a train.” Both officers turned to see
a “brand-new,” white, H2 Hummer go through the intersection of
As testified by Officer Brockew, “a
short while later” Officer Osarczuk informed Officer Brockew that he had spotted
what he believed to be the same vehicle. Officer Osarczuk observed a white H2 Hummer
still running parked along a street and conducted a traffic stop for reckless
driving. Upon approach of the vehicle,
Officer Osarczuk smelled the odor of alcohol and noticed several other signs
of impairment. Meisman did not comply
with Officer Osarczuk’s request for his driver’s license and registration. In response to questioning from Officer Osarcsuk,
Meisman stated that he was going 70 mph on
The sole issue raised by Meisman is
whether Officer Osarczuk had reasonable suspicion to believe Meisman was intoxicated
based upon the earlier observation of a similar vehicle speeding through an
intersection. Meisman argues that because
Officer Osarczuk could not verify the driver’s identity of the Hummer as the
individual driving through the
The Court finds that the Final Order must be sustained. Initially, the Court reiterates the well-settled law that an officer need only have a reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a traffic stop and to administer field sobriety tests. See Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)(setting forth factors to be considered by a court in determining whether a traffic stop is justified); see also State v. Russell, 659 So.2d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(same); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995)(finding that officer could have reasonable suspicion that a DUI was being committed since he observed the defendant traveling at a high rate of speed and, after exiting the vehicle, staggering, and exhibiting slurred speech, watery and bloodshot eyes, and the strong odor of alcohol) It is clear, under the facts of this case, that Officer Osarczuk had the requisite suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. Indeed, Meisman does not dispute that he was speeding or driving in a reckless manner.
Further, even though Officer Osarczuk
did not get a tag number and was unable to identify the driver until after
the traffic stop was initiated, the record supports Officer Osarczuk’s determination
that it was the same vehicle observed a short time earlier speeding through
the intersection. Officer Osarczuk
testified that, upon observing the Hummer, his conversation with Officer Brockew
to go look for the vehicle was “very quick” and that he got into his patrol
car in pursuit of the Hummer. Officer Osarczuk then traveled a “short distance”
before locating the Hummer. In reaching
the conclusion that it was the same vehicle, Officer Osarczuk testified that
“there’s not too many 2003 H-2 Hummers driving around.” Upon further inquiry, Officer Osarczuk said
the vehicle was a “brand-new,” “pristine” vehicle and that “there’s not too
many of them around in that area.” The
Court finds that based on the totality of the circumstances, including the
length of time and distance from the intersection to the traffic stop, coupled
with the specificity and uniqueness of the vehicle involved, Officer Osarczuk
had the requisite suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. See e.g. Russell, 659 So.2d
at 467; compare with Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 249 (
Therefore, it is,
ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied.
DONE AND
ORDERED in Chambers, at
___________________________________
DAVID A. DEMERS
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
Copies furnished to:
J. Kevin Hayslett, Esquire
Heather Rose Cramer, Assistant General Counsel
Bureau of Administrative Reviews