Canons

Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 2B A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.

Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3E(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself where his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(b) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself where the judge served as a lawyer or was the lower court judge in the matter at issue; the judge practiced law with a lawyer who served in the matter while practicing with the judge; or the judge has been a material witness concerning the matter.

Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(d) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself where the judge or the judge’s spouse, a person within the third degree of relationship to either the judge or the spouse, or the spouse of the relative is a party or officer, director or trustee of a party in the proceeding; a lawyer in the proceeding; is known by the judge to have more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a witness in the proceeding.

Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Commentary to Canon 3E(1) A judge should disclose on the record any information that he or she believes the parties or their attorneys might consider relevant to disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.

Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Commentary to Canon 3E(1)(d) The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is also affiliated does not in an of itself disqualify the judge.

A county judge whose child works in the state attorney’s office may continue to preside over criminal cases, as long as the judge discloses to the parties that the judge’s child works for the state attorney’s office. The judge’s child has no economic interest in the outcome of criminal cases handled by the state attorney’s office. 3E(1), 3E(1)(d)ii, Commentary to Canon 3E(1).

2011-21
Recedes from Opinions 77-12 and 77-04

A judge may not preside over felony arraignments in a county where the judge’s spouse is the supervisor of the State Attorney’s Office because it may cause the judge’s impartiality to reasonably be questioned.

Judge whose spouse is the elected public defender in the judge’s circuit may not preside over cases to which the public defender is assigned in the juvenile and mental health divisions, even if private attorneys handle the cases under case-by-case contracts and the public defender does not exercise any supervisory authority over those attorneys, because such conduct could create the appearance of impropriety. 2A, 2B, 3B(5), 3E(1)(d)(ii), 3F.

Judge who is the spouse of the elected Public Defender may preside over criminal cases involving the public defender’s office after the spouse’s retirement.  However, the relationship is relevant to the question of disqualification and should be disclosed for a reasonable period of time.  The same judge may not preside over public defender cases in which the judge’s spouse was privy to privileged communications if the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.  The judge may preside over public defender post-conviction hearings in which the spouse may be called to testify as long as the spouse is not a witness.  3E; 3E(1);and 3E(d)(ii).

Judge’s adult son who is a lawyer may accept employment at a law firm that handles cases that would ordinarily come before the judge, but the judge is disqualified from hearing cases handled by the adult son’s law firm.  The judge’s disclosure on the record at the earliest possible time of the judge’s adult child’s employment as a lawyer with the firm, coupled with a representation that the judge’s child does not and will not have any role in the case, and will be “walled off” from the case internally with the firm is not sufficient to avoid disqualification.  A judge may not appoint a special master or receiver from a law firm where the judge’s adult child is employed as an associate attorney. 2; 2B; 3C(4); 3E(1)(d); 3F; and Commentary to 3C(4); 3E(1)(d); 3F.

2007-16
Recedes from JEAC Opinion 2003-18

A judge is not automatically disqualified in all cases involving a law firm that employs the judge’s son-in-law as a part-time law clerk because the son-in-law has no more than a de minimus interest in most proceedings and the judge’s impartiality is unlikely to be reasonably questioned.  However, disclosure is required, and disqualification might be required if the son-in-law was working on the case in question.  The JEAC endorsed a case-by-case analysis and receded from Op. 03-18, which had determined that disqualification was required when a law firm employed the judge’s niece as a summer intern.   3E.

Judge must disqualify himself or herself from all cases involving any lawyer from a law firm employing the judge’s spouse as a paralegal, unless all parties agree to enter a remittal of disqualification.  3E(1); 3F.

Mere employment of a judge’s relative by the sheriff’s department does not automatically warrant or mandate disqualification in all cases involving the department because the family members will generally have no direct financial interest in the outcome of the matter.  Instead, disqualification is not required unless the family member is actually involved in the matter on behalf of the department.  Further, disclosure is not necessary unless the judge believes his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  3E(1) and Commentary.

Judge in juvenile delinquency division of court utilizing a unified family court concept must disqualify himself or herself from delinquency matter where the parents of the child involved are represented in a family law matter by the judge’s son’s law firm.  Even though the judge would not be presiding over the case involving the son’s law firm, the judge would be conferring with the family law judge about matters affecting the resolution of the family law and delinquency cases.  3E(1); 3F; and Commentary to Canon 3F.

Judge must disclose spouse’s business relationship with attorney in matters involving that attorney’s firm if, after considering several factors, the judge thinks it possible that a party might reasonably express concern over the judge’s ability to remain impartial. However, recusal would not be required unless the judge knows spouse would have more than a de minimis interest in the outcome of the proceeding. 3E(1)(d)(iii) and 3E(2).

Mere fact that spouse of Judge of Compensation Claims represents state bureau that is one of several under the Division of Risk Management does not require disqualification, although it does require disclosure. Instead, disqualification is required only where the spouse’s client is a named party in a worker’s compensation claim before the judge. 1, 2A, 3, and 3E.

Judge is required to inform parties when attorneys from firms employing the judge’s first cousins as attorneys appear before the judge. 3E(D)(ii) and 3D.

Judge must disqualify himself or herself in cases involving law firm employing judge’s niece as a legal intern unless, after disclosure, the parties agree that the judge not be disqualified. However, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require automatic disclosure and disqualification where a law firm that has employed the judge’s brother as an expert witness in an unrelated matter appears before the judge. 2A, 3E(1)(d), and 3F

Where judge is assigned to criminal division and judge’s spouse is a child victim specialist in the state attorney’s office, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not mandate disqualification of the judge in a criminal case in which the spouse has no involvement but which has allegations of sexual abuse to a child. However, the judge should make the disclosure in cases involving allegations of sexual abuse to a child so that the defendant and the state can determine whether the judge's spouse is, or will be, involved in the case. 3E

Judge responsible for setting conditions of pretrial release could preside over conferences with pretrial services assessment personnel supervised by the judge’s spouse because there was no indication that the spouse’s work or decisions would affect the judge’s decisions. 1, 2 and 2A.

Employment of spouse of the Administrative Judge of the Family Division as case manager in the Family Division violates the Code of Judicial Conduct by giving rise to the appearance of impropriety, especially where the judge acknowledged that the spouse’s work and decisions would affect the judge’s division. Further, this appearance would still exist even if the judge stepped down as the Administrative Judge. 1, 2 and 2A.

Judge must disclose when a party is represented by the law firm that previously represented the law firm of the judge’s spouse in a legal malpractice action for a reasonable period of time. However, the judge is not ethically bound to disqualify himself or herself in such cases unless the judge believes that his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 3E.

Judge may preside over cases in which the court reporter is employed by court reporting service owned by judge’s spouse provided that the judge is not involved in any decision regarding the spouse’s hiring as the contract court reporter. Further, the judge need not disclose that court reporters from the spouse’s business are covering court proceedings. 2B.

County judge married to the elected public defender in the judge’s circuit may not preside over cases in the criminal division to which the public defender is assigned. However, judge need not disclose relationship with public defender when conducting weekend or holiday appearance hearings before the public defender has been appointed. 3E, 3E(1), 3E(1)(d)(ii) and 3F.

If criminal division judge whose son-in-law is a candidate for the Office of Public Defender cannot be reassigned to a different division, the judge must disqualify himself or herself from any case in which the public defender is actually involved However, disqualification is not automatic where assistant public defenders are involved; instead, the judge should continue to disclose the situation and evaluate whether disqualification is merited on a case-by-case basis. 3E, 3E(1), and 3E(1)(a).

Even after four years had passed since judge represented medical center in medical malpractice claims, judge was still required to disclose former attorney-client relationship. 3E(1).

A judge who, along with his spouse, is a tenant/defendant in a residential condominium foreclosure proceeding may preside over residential foreclosure proceedings without recusing himself. However, the judge must disclose his status as tenant/defendant in a residential foreclosure proceeding to all residential foreclosure litigants. The judge must disclose his status to litigants who present motions for writs of possession or objections for the judge’s consideration, or to litigants in residential foreclosure cases involving tenant-occupied residential properties. 2, 3B(1), and 3E(1).

2010-25
recedes from JEAC opinions 89-5, 90-9, 93-25, and 96-13

A judge may hold stock in an insurance company that underwrites bail bonds which may be subject to forfeiture or motions to set aside and remit bond forfeitures, as long as the judge does not have more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceedings.  When a judge holds stock in an insurance company which underwrites bail bonds, he or she may forfeit bonds or hear motions to set aside forfeitures or motions to remit forfeitures, as long as the judge does not have more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceedings.  The judge must disclose the stock ownership in any case in which the insurance company underwrites a bail bond only if the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider the information relevant to the question of disqualification.  2; 3; 3E; 3E(1); 3E(1)(c); 3E(1)(d)(iii); 3F; 5D; 5D(4); 5E(1); and Definition Section.

Note: This opinion recedes from JEAC opinions 89-5, 90-9, 93-25, and 96-13.

judge may not allow juveniles to perform court-ordered community service by participating in a jogging program with the judge because such participation could undermine the impartiality of the judge and judicial office.  2A, 2B, 3B(7), 3E(1)(a), 5A(1), (2), (5), and (6).

Judge may not serve as chief judge of a circuit while in a committed relationship with one of the general magistrates in that circuit, even if the judge serving as the chief judge did not have a role in hiring the magistrate.  This impropriety or appearance of impropriety will continue to exist even if the judge’s first act upon becoming chief judge of the circuit is to execute an administrative order formally transitioning all supervisory authority over all general magistrates to another circuit court judge.  2.

Judge who is a member of a voluntary bar association is not required to “de-friend” lawyers who are also members on that organization’s Facebook page and who use Facebook to communicate among themselves about that organization and other non-legal matters.  However, a judge may not allow an attorney access to the judge’s personal social networking page as a “friend,” even if the judge sends a communication to all attorney “friends” or posts a permanent, prominent disclaimer on the judge’s Facebook profile page that the term “friend” should be interpreted to simply mean that the person is an acquaintance of the judge and not a “friend” in the traditional sense.  This prohibition of judges “friending” attorneys who may appear before the judge remains true if the judge accepts as “friends” all attorneys who request to be included or all persons whose names the judge recognizes, and others whose names the judge does not recognize but who share a number of common friends.  2A; 2B; 3E; Commentary to 2A; and Commentary to Canon 3E(1).

Judge’s judicial assistant may add lawyers who may appear before the judge as “friends” on a social networking site, as long as the activity is wholly independent of the judge and does not reference the judge or the judge’s office.  2B and 3C(2).

Pursuant to the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, when a judge is a partner in a building partnership with the County Attorney, the judge must disqualify himself or herself from all cases in which the county is involved.  Such disqualification is required except in cases in which the county is represented by outside counsel which is independent of the County Attorney’s supervision.  3E(1); 3E(1)(c); 3F; 5; 5A; 5D(1); 5D(1)(b); and 5D(4).

Judge may not rent a room in the judge’s home to a non-related person who is on community control because the judge could bear witness to the person’s conduct and thus, potentially become a witness in court.  2A; 2B; 5A; and 5D(1)(a).

Judge may post comments and other material on the judge's page on a social networking site, if the publication of such material does not otherwise violate the Code of Judicial Conduct.  However, a judge may not add lawyers who may appear before the judge as "friends" on a social networking site, or permit such lawyers to add the judge as their "friend." 2B; Commentary to 2A.

Judge’s acceptance of a weekend trip to Maine with an attorney eight to nine years ago does not require the judge to continue recusing himself or herself from cases handled by the attorney and the attorney's law firm.  Disclosure on the record of the last eight to nine years of voluntary recusal and the reason for the recusal is required.  3E(1); 5D(5); 5D(5)(c); 5D(5)(e); 5D(5)(h); and Commentary to 3E(1) and 5D(5)(h).

Judge must disqualify himself or herself from all cases in which the judge’s former fiancé serves as an expert witness and the engagement ended less than three years ago.  3E(1); 3C(4); 3F.

Judge must disclose that former fiancé’s CPA firm leases office space from a partnership in which the judge is a general partner and the engagement ended less than three years ago.   3E(1); 3C(4); 3F.

Judge must disclose friendship with attorney even in cases handled by the attorney’s associate if, in the judge's estimation, the nature of the friendship is sufficient to warrant reasonable concern over the judge's impartiality. 3E(1).

Judge should recuse himself or herself for a reasonable time from cases involving an attorney or any member of the attorney's law firm where the judge has a close social, election, and professional relationship with the attorney. 2 and 4.

Judge may appoint psychologist to whom the judge was once engaged over ten years ago to conduct evaluations in criminal cases. Further, the judge need not disclose this relationship, though he or she might have to disclose a continuing friendship with the psychologist on a case-by-case basis. 2 and 3E(1)

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to recuse himself or herself from cases involving an attorney with whom the judge owns a parcel of real estate, even though the attorney appears before the judge infrequently, the judge’s ownership interest is small and the judge’s involvement is primarily passive. 3F(1)(c), 3F, 5A(3) and 5D(1)(a),(b).

Mere possibility that judge in family division might be involved in litigation with former spouse concerning their children does not require disclosure or recusal from all litigation concerning children. 3E(1).

Judge may not privately mediate his or her friends’ marriage dissolution because no law or court rule expressly authorizes such service. 5F and 5G.

Administrative judge in county criminal division who owns a one-sixth interest in recreational property in which the state attorney also owns an interest must disqualify himself or herself from all cases involving the state attorney’s office because of the possible appearance of impropriety. 3E, 3E(1), 5D, 5D(1), 5D(1)(b), 5D(2), and 5D(4).

A judge may preside over a matter without recusing him or herself when the judge was an attorney representing the adverse party of an attorney/litigant over seven years ago, but the judge must disclose his or her involvement in the previous case. However, the judge must recuse him or herself if the previous contested litigation affects the judge’s ability to act impartially in a current unrelated civil matter. 3E, Commentary to Canon 3E(1).

A judge may allow criminal arraignments to be broadcast nationally on television by a regular network because the Florida Supreme Court has mandated that electronic media coverage of public judicial proceedings in the trial courts of the state are permitted subject to the presiding judge’s authority to control the proceedings, ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and ensure the fair administration of justice.  The judge may not, however, be paid under a contract with the television network to perform a teaching segment in which the judge explains the law and sentencing choices, and interviews different “players” in the court system. This is true because discussing the judge’s reasoning and sentencing choices could lead to frequent disqualification, cast doubt on the judge’s ability to act impartially in cases the judge discusses publicly, or interfere with a fair trial or hearing. 2A, 3(B)(9), 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B.

A judge is not required to recuse from a case in which one of the attorneys is married to an attorney who represents the judge in an unrelated civil matter, where the spouses are and have always worked at different firms. This is true as long as the attorney spouse appearking before the judge has no financial stake in the outcome of the judge’s personal case and the judge’s attorney maintains confidentiality. However, the judge must disclose to the parties that an attorney who is appearing in a case before the judge is married to an attorney representing the judge in an unrelated civil matter. 2, 3B(1), and 3E(1).

A judge who intends to seek re-election may not preside over a case in which one of the party’s attorneys is the law partner and campaign treasurer. Presiding over a case that involves a political opponent’s law partner/campaign treasurer may call into question the judge’s impartiality. 3E(1).

A senior judge who owns several residential mortgages on properties and receives income from those properties may handle mortgage foreclosure matters, as long as the business dealings do not involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with persons likely to come before the judge personally or before other judges on the judge’s court.   5D(1)(a), Canon 5D(2); Commentary to Canon 5; Application to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Section B(1).

A newly-elected judge who previously served as a public defender may hear a case involving a defendant who was represented by the public defender’s office during the judge’s employment with that office, as long as the judge has no involvement with the case, and no knowledge of the facts of the case unless there are other circumstances which call into question the judge’s impartiality.  3E(1)(b) and Commentary to 3E(1)(b).
Note:  Committee concludes in this opinion that opinion 91-17 was erroneously decided because it does not recognize the commentary to canon 3e(1)(b) that states that lawyers in government agencies are not automatically disqualified from hearing matters simply because they were assigned to the public defender’s office at the time the lawyer (judge) was employed by that office.

A full-time general magistrate who hears family and civil matters exclusively in one county may not work with the state as a certified family mediator in an adjoining county on weekends and days off from employment because combining the roles of a civil/family magistrate and a private certified family magistrate in one person could cause an erosion of the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the general master.  1, 2A, and 3.

A Traffic Hearing Officer may contribute the annual fee of $350.00 to the local Legal Aid Society instead of performing pro bono legal service hours unless the local Legal Aid Society engages in litigation or represents impoverished people in proceedings before the hearing officer.  Similarly, a Traffic Hearing Officer may perform pro bono legal service hours for the local Legal Aid Society as long as the hours do not include areas of law in civil or criminal traffic court.  1, 2A, Commentary to 2A, 3, 5C(3), and Application to the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Retired judge may sit as a senior judge and as a traffic infraction hearing officer in the same judicial circuit.  The Committee did not address possible concerns regarding dual office holding, as this is beyond the scope of the JEAC’s authority.  1; 2; 3; 4; and 5.

Judge’s entry of an Order of Recusal in a civil matter because litigant was married to assistant state attorney with whom the judge had a “tumultuous” relationship does not mandate recusal or disqualification in all cases involving any assistant state attorney.  3B(1); 3E.

Judge may not satisfy disclosure requirements by (1) sending a mass mailing to all members of the local bar listing the members of the judge’s campaign committee; or (2) placing advertisements with this information in the local bar association newsletter.  Instead, such disclosure must be on the record in open court.  Notice by posting in the courthouse is neither required nor sufficient for disclosure.  3E(1).

While a judge is required to disclose to the State when a criminal defense attorney appearing before the judge is currently on his or her campaign committee, disqualification depends upon the extent of the attorney’s involvement in the committee and the remoteness in time of the attorney’s participation.  However, if disqualification is required and not waived, it extends to any member of the attorney’s law firm.  3E(1) and Commentary; 3F.

If judge leases office building he or she owns to a local legal aid group, the judge must disqualify himself or herself from any cases in which lawyers affiliated with the group appear unless the parties agree to a waiver.  Further, if the judge cannot minimize the number of disqualifications due to the rental relationship, the judge must divest himself or herself of the office building as soon as it can be accomplished without serious financial detriment.  3E(1); 3F; 5; 5D(1)(b), (2), (4).

Judge should not appear in public relations campaign for public library system because such involvement could be viewed as showing favoritism to the county, likely a frequent litigant before the court.  Commentary to Canon 3E(1).

While the Code does not prohibit a judge from remaining the beneficiary of a land trust along with some of the judge’s former partners, the judge must disqualify himself from any cases in which those former partners are involved.  Consequently, the judge should dispose of any interest in the trust if it is likely that the co-beneficiaries will appear frequently in proceedings before the court on which the judge serves.  3E; 3F; 5; 5D(1)(b); 5D(4); and Commentary to Canon 3E(1).

Part-time traffic magistrate may rent office space from law firm that handles traffic matters as long as the relationship is at arm’s length and the lease is commercially reasonable.  However, it would be “ill advised” for the magistrate to hear any of the law firm’s cases because the magistrate’s impartiality might be questioned.  Also, if the magistrate becomes a general contractor with the firm, he must disqualify himself or herself in any case involving the firm.  3E(1) and 3E(1)(c).

In the event that a judge’s judicial assistant is or has recently been employed by an attorney who subsequently appears before that judge, judge should disclose the employment.  No canons cited.

Judge is not required to direct a staff attorney to disqualify himself or herself from all cases involving the legal department of the governmental agency which employs the staff attorney’s spouse as an attorney where the spouse exercises no supervisory authority within the legal department. 3C(2); 3E(1); and 3E(1)(d)(ii).

While a judge must disclose to parties in a pending case that the judge has reported an attorney in the case to the Florida Bar for alleged misconduct in the case, the judge is not necessarily disqualified. Also, the judge is not obligated to disclose the reporting in subsequent cases in which the attorney appears before the judge. 3D(2); Commentary to 3E(1).

While a judge is not required to report a notary public or a party to the appropriate entities for possible misconduct, there is no ethical bar against the judge’s doing so. Further, if the judge makes such a report, the judge is required to disclose this to the parties, and disqualification may be warranted given that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 3D(2); Commentary to 3E(1).

Judge is not required to disclose that judge reported a party to the State Attorney’s Office in other cases involving the party’s attorney’s law firm; nor is the judge required to disclose in those same cases that the judge reported the law firm’s notary to an entity for misconduct. 3D(2); Commentary to 3E(1).

Where judge has hired a lawyer for representation in a civil lawsuit, judge must automatically recuse himself or herself from all cases involving the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm, even if those cases are uncontested and even though the judge is the only judge assigned to the probate and guardianship division of the circuit. 2, 3, 3E(1) and Commentary, and 3F.

Two years is an acceptable length of time for new judge to recuse himself or herself from cases handled by former law firm. 3E(1)(d)(ii) and 3D.

Judge should recuse himself or herself for a reasonable time from cases involving an attorney or any member of the attorney's law firm where the judge has a close social, election, and professional relationship with the attorney. 2 and 4.

There is no per se requirement that a judge disqualify himself or herself or make a disclosure in cases involving an attorney who was a member of the judge’s re-election committee. Instead, the judge must evaluate each case individually in light of the extent of the attorney’s involvement in the election and the remoteness in time of that involvement. 3E(1) and 3F

Where judge once served as law clerk to a now-suspended attorney who appears before the judge pro se, judge need not observe a per se rule of disclosure or disqualification provided that no financial arrangement exists between the judge and the attorney in question and, further, that a sufficient time has passed so that no objective person would question the judge's impartiality. 3E(1).

2000-34
Recedes from JEAC Opinions 74-04, 75-07, and 78-16

Unless disqualification is waived after disclosure, a judge must recuse himself or herself from cases in which a former law partner is the attorney of record and that attorney’s firm is making payment to the judge pursuant to a promissory note. 3E(1) and 5D(4).

Chief Judge of circuit should not allow trial court law clerks employed by the circuit to serve as arbitrators in that circuit because the arbitration matters could ultimately come before the court. 5F, Preamble Definitions Section and Applications Section B.