Opinion Number: 99-4
Date of Issue: January 28, 1999
WHETHER A JUDGE MAY EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT RELATING TO MATTERS
WITHIN HIS KNOWLEDGE PERTAINING TO A CASE HE HANDLED WHILE IN
PRACTICE?
Whether a judge may execute an affidavit relating to matters within
his knowledge pertaining to a case he handled while in practice?
ANSWER: No.
A former client of the inquiring judge has been criminally
charged with workers' compensation fraud. The attorney now representing
the former client has drafted an affidavit for the inquiring judge
to sign. The inquiring judge believes that "the affidavit
is substantially correct."
This affidavit would be given to the Assistant Statewide Prosecutor
handling the prosecution of the case. The attorney believes that
an affidavit from the inquiring judge may help in resolving the
case. The affidavit explains why certain steps were taken by the
inquiring judge during the course of representing the former client.
The affidavit also comments on the former client's good character.
The inquiring judge asks if signing the affidavit would be a violation
of the Judicial Code of Conduct.
The proposed affidavit contains factual statements regarding work
that the inquiring judge performed for the former client and it
also contains opinions regarding the good character of the former
client.
Canon 2B of The Code of Judicial Conduct specifically forbids
a judge from voluntarily testifying as a character witness. A
judge may testify if subpoenaed. The Commentary to Canon 2B states:
"A judge must not testify voluntarily as a character witness
because to do so may lend the prestige of the judicial office
in support of the party for whom the judge testifies . . . A judge
may, however, testify when properly summoned. Except in unusual
circumstances where the demands of justice require, a judge should
discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a character
witness."
In Opinion 91-5 the inquiring judge asked
whether he could testify on behalf of his son-in-law before The Florida Bar
Examiners regarding his fitness to be admitted into The Florida Bar. The Committee
responded that the inquiring judge could not voluntarily testify, but could
do so if done in response to a subpoena or an official inquiry or invitation
from the Board of Bar Examiners.
In Opinion 94-40 the Committee held that
a judge could testify as a character witness for a physician before a medical
disciplinary board if he testified pursuant to a properly executed subpoena.
See, also, Opinion 86-10 (a judge could
appear on behalf of a suspended Florida Bar member seeking reinstatement if
in response "to a subpoena issued for the aforementioned purposes")
and Opinion 82-15 (absent an official inquiry,
a judge could not write voluntary character reference letters to the Clemency
Board and the Board of Bar Examiners on behalf of an individual seeking a pardon
and admission to the Bar examination)1.
Although Canon 2B specifically deals with a judge acting as a
character witness, there have been a number of Committee opinions
dealing with a judge testifying as a fact witness. Committee opinions
have construed Canon 2B as requiring any testimony of a judge
be pursuant to a subpoena, even if the proposed testimony is factual
versus opinion.
The most comprehensive opinion regarding a judge giving factual testimony in
a proceeding is found in Opinion 97-1. The
opinion sets forth many of the opinions on this issue. In the Opinion the Committee
stated: "The tenor of the pending inquiry suggests that the inquiring judge
will be called solely as a fact witness concerning the potential question of
unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, his testimony is permissible. Committee
opinions have construed Canon 2B as requiring any testimony of a judge
be pursuant to a subpoena. Accordingly, the rule would apply in the present
case." (emphasis added)
In Opinion 79-12 the inquiring judge was asked
to testify before a state administrative agency regarding a statute the inquiring
judge had drafted when he was the general counsel for a state administrative
agency. The validity of the statute was in question, and the inquiring judge
was asked to testify as to the history and purpose of the rule and its relationship
with another statute. A majority of the Committee held that the inquiring judge
could testify only in response to a subpoena.
In Opinion 95-32 the inquiring judge sought
advice as to whether he was obligated to provide testimony in a bar grievance
proceeding somehow connected to a motion for recusal made in the case before
him. The Committee advised that under Canon 2B, voluntary testimony would be
prohibited. The majority of the Committee decided that the inquiring judge could
testify if properly summoned.
In Opinion 93-31 the Committee found that
a judge's appearance as a witness for the State in a misdemeanor case was permissible
since he was properly subpoenaed.
In Opinion 95-35 the inquiring judge sought
a Committee opinion on whether she could be called as an independent expert
witness in the area of attorney's fees. A slim majority of the Committee decided
that the judge could testify if subpoenaed, although four of the responding
members felt that a judge could not testify as an independent expert witness.
See also Opinion 98-15, where the Committee
found the judge could not provide a voluntary statement pertaining to a criminal
investigation of the judge's family friend. The authorities contacted the inquiring
judge during a criminal investigation of the judge's friend. The judge believed
that he had facts that could exculpate his friend. A majority of the committee
believed that the judge could only provide a statement if properly subpoenaed.
A minority of the Committee believed that there was a difference between a judge
appearing in a formal proceeding and giving testimony and cooperating with an
investigative body.
The Committee notes that the preceding Opinions would overrule this Committee's
prior Opinions in 76-9 and the implied holding
in 90-2.
In 76-9 a majority of the Committee found
that a judge could execute affidavits pertaining to the services he rendered
and the time he spent on probate cases that he had handled when he was practicing
law with a law firm. The Committee found that Canon 2B referred to testifying
voluntarily as a character witness; Canon 2B did not apply to giving affidavits
as to services rendered and time spent on cases a judge handled as a lawyer.
In Opinion 90-2 the Committee is asked whether
a judge might appear voluntarily to testify on Florida law at a civil trial
to be conducted in England. The Committee stated that it was evident from the
judge's inquiry that he would not be testifying to any factual matter. Therefore
the Committee concluded that the judge could not appear voluntarily to testify
in the English Court. The opinion seems to indicate that if the judge was going
to testify about factual matters then he could appear voluntarily without being
under subpoena to testify.
In conclusion, the proposed affidavit submitted by the inquiring
judge is in conflict with Canon 2B. The judge should not execute
an affidavit in this matter. The inquiring judge may testify in
a proceeding if he is subpoenaed to do so.
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct 2B.
Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinions: 98-15,
97-1, 95-35,
95-32, 94-40,
93-31, 91-5,
90-2, 86-10,
82-15, 79-12
and 76-9.
The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee is expressly charged with
rendering advisory opinions interpreting the application of the
Code of Judicial Conduct to specific circumstances confronting
or affecting a judge or judicial candidate. Its opinions are advisory
to the inquiring party, to the Judicial Qualifications Commission
and to the judiciary at large. Conduct that is consistent with
an advisory opinion issued by the Committee may be evidence of
good faith on the part of the judge, but the Judicial Qualifications
Commission is not bound by the interpretive opinions by the Committee.
Petition of the Committee on Standards of Conduct Governing
Judges, 698 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1997). However, in reviewing the
recommendations of the Judicial Qualification Commission for discipline,
the Florida Supreme Court will consider conduct in accordance
with a Committee opinion as evidence of good faith. Id.
For further information, contact The Honorable Lisa D. Kahn, Chair,
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, Harry T. and Harriette V.
Moore Justice Center, 2825 Judge Fran Jamieson Way, Viera, Florida,
32940-8006.
Participating Members: Judges Cardonne, Dell, C. Kahn, L. Kahn, Patterson, Rodriquez, Rushing, Smith, Swartz, Tolton and Attorney Blanton.
Copies furnished to:
Justice Charles T. Wells
All Committee Members
All Members of the J.Q.C
Office of the State Courts Administrator (Name of inquiring judge
deleted from this copy)
1A judge
may be subject to disciplinary proceedings if an improper character
reference letter is written. See In re Ward, 654 So.2d
549 (Fla. 1995), In re Fogan, 646 So.2d 191(Fla. 1994);
In re Stafford, 643 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 1994); and In re
Abel, 632 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1994).