County Criminal
Court:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – Continuance – Since the State met all requirements for a
continuance, its motion should have been granted, rendering the subsequent
granting of Appellee’s Motion to Suppress in error. Reversed.
State v. Sanders, No. CRC10008071CFAWS,
(Fla. 6th Cir.App.Ct. June 1, 2011).
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES FOR REHEARING AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY
APPELLATE DIVISION
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
UCN: 512010CF008071A000WS
v. Case
No: CRC-10-08071-CFAWS
Lower
No: 10-5847-XDPT-WS
ANGELA PAIGE SANDERS,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Appeal from Pasco County Court
County Judge
Debra Roberts
Christopher
C. Dyer, A.S.A.
for
Appellant
Ron
Smith, Esq.
for
Appellee
ORDER AND OPINION
The
State appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion for a continuance,
which resulted in the trial court granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. Since the State met all the requirements for
a continuance, its motion should have been granted. Appellee’s motion to suppress also should not
have been granted as a consequence. Therefore, this Court reverses both orders as
set forth below.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
On February
11, 2010, Appellee was charged with Driving while Under the Influence. Appellee filed a motion to suppress all evidence
resulting from the stop. The hearing on Appellee’s
motion to suppress was scheduled for July 30, 2010. At the State’s request, the parties agreed
prior to the hearing to reschedule because Officer Pascalli would not be
available on that date. The hearing was
rescheduled to October 22, 2010.
At
the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Daniel Joseph Rengering testified
that he was on patrol February 11, 2010 at around 10:00 in the morning. There was a complaint that Appellee was
improperly parked at a convenience store at the corner of Gulf Drive and Grand
Boulevard in New Port Richey. Appellee’s
red Mustang was partially parked in one lane and partially in either a
handicapped or fire lane grid that was lined off. Appellee was in the driver’s seat with her
vehicle running and her head back.
Officer Rengering did not know whether Appellee was awake or not. Officer Pascalli tapped on her window and
tried to speak to her. Appellee’s speech
was slurred, her eyes were glassy, and she was very lethargic. Appellee stated that she had just gotten off
work and this was early in the morning.
Officer Rengering was standing next to Officer Pascalli, who was a
DUI/STEP officer. Officer Pascalli asked
Appellee to exit the vehicle. Officer
Pascalli positioned his vehicle so he could record the incident and the field
sobriety exercises.
On
cross-examination, Officer Rengering admitted that the case was really Officer
Pascalli’s case because he conducted the field sobriety exercises, took her
into custody, and wrote the tickets. Officer
Rengering still could not remember whether Appellee was parked in a fire lane
or handicapped lane. He could not say
whether Appellee was in violation of any statute.
At
this point during the hearing, the State informed the trial court that it would
have liked to call Officer Pascalli, but he called in sick that morning. The State did not notify the court prior to
the start of the hearing because he had received information that his officers
were both present. He had assumed that
it was both officers for this case; however, the other officer was for another
case. As such, the State requested a
continuance.
Defense
counsel pointed that Officer Pascalli also failed to appear at the DHSMV
hearing after being subpoenaed. Officer
Pascalli was also not present before Judge Wansboro on the improper parking
ticket, on May 7, 2010. The trial court commented
that Judge Wansboro dismissed that case because the officer did not appear. Defense counsel argued that the State could
not show in good faith that the officer would show up if the case was
continued. The State countered that the
motion to continue should be granted, as it has made a good faith effort to get
the officer there for the hearing, and the officer is still alive and
working.
The
trial court denied the State’s request for a continuance and stated that the
motion to suppress would have to be granted.
The trial court issued its amended order denying the State’s Motion to
Continue and granting Appellee’s Motion to Suppress on November 29, 2010. The
State filed a timely notice of appeal on December 7, 2010.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A trial court's ruling on a motion for
continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. J.S. v. State, 796 So. 2d 1256 (Fla.
4th DCA 2001). An appellate court should
not reverse the denial of a motion for continuance unless there has been a plain
abuse of discretion that clearly and affirmatively appears in the record. Magill v. State, 386 So. 2d 1188, 1189
(Fla. 1980). A party seeking a
continuance due to witness unavailability must establish four factors: (1)
prior due diligence to obtain the witness’s presence; (2) that substantially
favorable testimony would have been forthcoming; (3) that the witness was
available and willing to testify; and (4) that the denial of the continuance
caused material prejudice. State v.
Humphreys, 867 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
The State met the four factors
necessary to receive a continuance.
First, the State exercised prior due diligence to secure Officer
Pascalli’s presence at the hearing by issuing and serving a subpoena on the
officer. Second, Officer Pascalli would
provide substantially favorable testimony, as he was the lead officer, who
conducted the field sobriety exercises, took Appellee into custody, and wrote
the tickets. Third, Officer Pascalli was
still employed by the New Port Richey Police Department, but was ostensibly
sick that morning. Finally, the State
was materially prejudiced because without Officer Pascalli, it was unable to adduce
sufficient testimony to justify the stop.
Thus, all four factors were met.
When denying a continuance due to
witness unavailability amounts to a dismissal of the charges, such denial has
been held an abuse of discretion when there was no showing of prejudice to the
defendant. Cf. State v. Lundy, 531 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Here, the trial court’s denial of the State’s
motion to continue and the resulting suppression of evidence were tantamount to
a dismissal of the charges. The State was
left with no evidence on which to proceed in its prosecution. The State must be given a fair opportunity to
be heard. See, Humphreys, at 598.
While we understand the trial court’s
frustration of not finding out until the middle of a hearing that a material
witness was not present, we still must reverse.
The trial court could have issued an order to show cause requiring Officer
Pascalli to appear before the court to explain why he should not be declared in
contempt. The trial court’s order
denying the State’s motion for continuance and the resulting order granting
Appellee’s motion to suppress shall be reversed. It is therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the trial court’s order denying The
State’s motion to continue is hereby REVERSED, and the trial court’s subsequent
order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress is hereby REVERSED.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers, at New Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida this 1ST
day of June 2011.
Original
order entered on June 1, 2011 by Circuit Judges Stanley R. Mills, W. Lowell
Bray, Jr., and Daniel D. Diskey.