County
Criminal Court: CRIMINAL LAW —
DUI — Motion to Suppress — Appellee’s behavior at the accident scene provided
the officer with adequate probable cause to arrest. Trial court’s order
granting motion to suppress is reversed. State of Florida v. James Carl
McKay, No. CRC10-001092-CFAES (Fla. 6th Cir. App. Ct. April 21, 2011).
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES FOR REHEARING AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY
APPELLATE DIVISION
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
UCN: 512010CF001092A000ES
v. Case
No: CRC1001092CFAES
Lower
No: 09-0582XBZTEA
JAMES CARL McKAY,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Appeal from Pasco County Court
County
Judge Robert P. Cole
Kenneth
V. Compton, A.S.A.
for Appellant
Todd Thurow, A.P.D.
for Appellee
ORDER
AND OPINION
The
State appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. The State asserts that Appellee’s behavior at
the scene of the accident provided the officer with adequate probable cause to
arrest. We agree. Therefore, this Court reverses the trial
court’s order as set forth below.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
On March
2, 2009, Appellee was issued a traffic citation charging him with DUI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the field
sobriety exercises and his refusal to take a blood or urine test. At the February 9, 2010 hearing on the motion
to suppress, Trooper Michael Meier testified
that he responded to a traffic crash at 2:30 in the afternoon at Boyette Road and Bainwood Lane in
Wesley Chapel. Two cars appeared to have
been involved in a head-on collision.
Appellee
was walking side to side from the east side to the west side of the road. Appellee was on his feet nearly the entire
time. There was a lack of any kind evidence
of alcoholic beverages. Appellee’s
cheeks were flushed, pupils were dilated, eyelids were heavy, and eyes were a
little bloodshot. His eye movements were
limited to what the neck would provide in that Appellee moved his head instead
of just his eyes to see. Appellee’s
speech was “a little mumbly and slurry.”
Trooper
Meier had to instruct Appellee several times for him to understand. Appellee appeared to understand, but then
would do what he wanted anyway. Several
times, Trooper Meier had to pull Appellee out of traffic because he would walk
in front of oncoming cars of which Appellee was unaware. He was slow and clumsy reaching for his
wallet; his documents fell out on the floor.
After these observations, Trooper Meier believed that a further
investigation for impairment was warranted.
He explained to Appellee that he was switching from conducting a crash
investigation to a criminal investigation for DUI at 3:05 p.m.
Trooper
Meier asked Appellee to perform field sobriety exercises. The results of the HGN were
inconclusive. Appellee offered his
breath a couple of times, but Trooper Meier explained that it was not necessary
since he did not think that Appellee was under the influence of alcohol. Appellee did not say that he had any injuries, just that his head hurt. On the one-leg stand, Appellee did relatively
poorly. Since Appellee did poorly on one
leg, Trooper Meier allowed Appellee to try on the other leg. Appellee held his arms out like an airplane,
leaned far to one side, and was unsteady.
He could not keep his foot up for longer than the count of two. His heel came down about six times, as he
dropped it every two counts. On the
walk-and-turn test, Trooper Meier demonstrated it to Appellee two or three
times. Appellee did not have any questions
as to how to perform it, even after Trooper Meier told him to feel free to ask
and he would explain it again. Appellee
missed his heel to toe every time. He
had trouble keeping balance and used his arms.
Appellee started twice after Trooper Meier told him not to begin until
after all the instructions. Trooper
Meier allowed Appellee to repeat the exercise again without his sandals to rule
out whether his sandals were contributing to his poor performance. Appellee still could not do it. He did not do nine steps in his sandals, and then
miscounted altogether on the way back.
Appellee miscounted while barefoot by counting 18 times one way and 20
times on the way back. Trooper Meier
would rate Appellee’s performance on the walk and turn as poor. All the exercises were performed with his
arms out.
Trooper
Meier read Miranda warnings to Appellee at 3:15 p.m. Appellee claimed that he was not on any
medications. Appellee admitted he was
the driver in the crash. He persistently
kept trying to have another man change the car’s tire so it could be driven
away. Trooper Meier was going to have
the car towed due to its condition. The
car’s tire was the least of its problems, as it sustained substantial damage.
Based
on Trooper Meier’s experience with traffic crashes and head injuries,
Appellee’s conduct was not consistent with a head injury. Usually someone with a head injury will not
feel anything right away. A couple hours
after the crash, they will start feeling the effects and may not be able to
stand. Appellee was dazed, but knew that
he had gotten into an accident.
Once
Trooper Meier was confident that Appellee was impaired, he placed him under
arrest. He read Implied Consent to
Appellee for a urine test. Appellee
agreed and did not have any questions about what was read to him. There was some redness on Appellee’s
forehead, which would be consistent with a frontal hit. Appellee’s windshield was damaged. Appellee only commented that he had a
headache. Appellee had refused medical
treatment from EMS two and a half hours prior.
There was no blood on Appellee.
As a precautionary measure, Trooper Meier took Appellee to Pasco
Regional to get a medical clearance, which the doctor gave. The form said that Appellee had a head
contusion, but no neurological defect.
Trooper Meier was never able to get urine from Appellee. He asked him several times at the hospital,
but Appellee said that he could not go.
Trooper Meier offered him some water and tried to take him to the
restroom. Appellee still would not produce
any urine by 5:27 p.m.
The
trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress, on February 22, 2010. The State filed a timely notice of appeal two
days later.
LAW
AND ANALYSIS
A
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumptively correct and will
be upheld if supported by the record. Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d
155, 160 (Fla. 2007); State v. Shuttleworth,
927 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Our review presents a mixed question of law
and fact. Butler v. State, 706
So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). An appellate court is bound by the lower
court's factual findings if they are supported by competent, substantial
evidence. Cuervo, at 160. However,
the trial court's application of the law to the facts is reviewed under the de novo standard. Williams v. State, 769 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
In
this case, Appellee’s behavior at the scene of the accident provided the
officer with sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellee for DUI. Trooper Meier testified that although he did
not suspect alcohol use, Appellee mumbled, had bloodshot eyes, was confused,
and repeatedly attempted to dart across a busy street. Although Trooper Meier had sufficient
probable cause to arrest Appellee with these observations, Appellee’s field
sobriety exercises further corroborated the belief that Appellee was under the
influence. Appellee was unable to
balance himself on either leg or walk in a straight line. Nothing in the record indicated that Appellee
had an injury that impaired him during the exercises or caused his unusual
behavior. Trooper Meier testified that
Appellee’s conduct was not consistent with a head injury. Even if Appellee had any injury, which would
have explained or contributed to his behavior, that alternative explanation
would go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
The
trial court improperly granted Appellee’s motion to suppress. It is clear that Trooper Meier had sufficient
probable cause to arrest Appellee. This
Court, however, agrees with the trial court’s written order in that Appellee’s
refusal to give urine after his arrest and reading of implied consent are
admissible. This Court also agrees that
the probative value of the urine taken hours after the crash is admissible, as
it goes to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence. The motion to suppress should have been
denied as to any fruits of the arrest. It
is therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress is hereby REVERSED.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers, at New Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida this 21st
day of April 2011.
Original
order entered on April 21, 2011 by Circuit Judges Stanley R. Mills, W. Lowell
Bray, Jr., and Daniel D. Diskey.