Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Quasi-Judicial Action, Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles: DRIVER’S LICENSES – early reinstatement of
driver’s license – hearing officer did not depart from the essential
requirements of law in denying application for “business purposes only” license,
pursuant to section 322.271(1)(c), based on the medical needs of driver’s mother
– appellate court must defer to reasonable interpretation of statute by the
administering agency - Petition denied. Harmon v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
No. 05-0009AP-88B (6th
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND
APPELLATE DIVISION
WAYNE MICHAEL HARMON,
Petitioner,
vs. Appeal No. 05-0009AP-88B
UCN522005AP000009XXXXCV
STATE OF
OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,
BUREAU OF DRIVER IMPROVEMENT,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
THIS CAUSE came before
the Court on the Amended Petition for Writ of Certiorari and the Response. Upon consideration
of the same, the record and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that
the Amended Petition must be denied as set forth below.
The
Petitioner, Wayne Michael Harmon (Harmon), seeks review of the Final Order, entered
December 29, 2004, in which the hearing officer for the Respondent, Department
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department), denied Harmon’s application
for early reinstatement of his driver’s license. In reviewing the Final Order and the
administrative action taken by the Department, this Court must determine
whether Harmon was afforded procedural due process, whether the essential
requirements of law were observed, and whether the Department’s findings and
judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. See Vichich v. Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 799 So.2d 1069, 1073 (
The record shows that Harmon’s driving privilege was revoked following seven convictions, including six DUI convictions. Harmon was granted a driver’s license for employment purposes on December 11, 2003. Harmon requested and was granted a hearing by the Department, on December 29, 2004, to change his restricted license from that of “employment purposes only” to “business purposes only” pursuant to Florida Statutes,
§ 322.271(1)(c).[1] Harmon sought a business purposes restricted license which, unlike an employment purposes license, allows driving for “medical purposes.”
At the hearing, Harmon testified that he provides at-home care for his chronically ill mother who requires frequent transportation to doctor’s appointments. Harmon testified that his mother has missed doctor’s appointments and that his wife is overwhelmed in assisting with his mother’s care. After considering Harmon’s undisputed testimony, the hearing officer concluded that he had no authority to grant a business purposes only license based on the medical needs of Harmon’s mother. The hearing officer also found that Harmon had violated his employment purposes only license by driving to the hearing that day.
Before
this Court, Harmon argues that the hearing officer failed to observe the
essential requirements of law and that the hearing officer’s finding that Harmon
failed to establish a hardship other than employment purposes was not supported
by competent substantial evidence. In
reviewing these issues, the Court finds that it must defer to a reasonable
interpretation of a statute by the administering agency.
Additionally, the hearing officer found that Harmon had violated the terms of his employment purposes only license by driving to the hearing in concluding that Harmon should not have the additional driving privileges associated with a business purposes only license. The Court will not reweigh the evidence and testimony presented to arrive at a different conclusion. See Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Satter, 643 So.2d 692, 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)(concluding that the hearing officer, as trier of fact, was in the best position to evaluate the evidence and witnesses).
Therefore, it is,
ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers, at
________________________________
JOHN
A. SCHAEFER
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
_________________________________ ___________________________
LAUREN LAUGHLIN JAMES CASE
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
Copies furnished to:
Larry C. Hoffman, Esquire
Carlos J. Raurell, Assistant General Counsel
Bureau of Administrative Reviews
[1] This section provides: “1. ‘A driving privilege restricted to business purposes only’ means a driving privilege that is limited to any driving necessary to maintain livelihood, including driving to and from work, necessary on-the-job driving, driving for educational purposes, and driving for church and for medical purposes”; and, “2. ‘A driving privilege restricted to employment purposes only’ means a driving privilege that is limited to driving to and from work and any necessary on-the-job driving required by an employer or occupation.”