IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF
STATE OF
Appellant,
v.
Case No. CRC 04-58 APANO
UCN522004AP000058XXXXCR
JOHN REVILLA
Appellee
____________________________________/
Opinion filed ________________.
Appeal from an order of the
County Judge William Overton
C. Marie King, Esq.
Assistant State Attorney
Timothy Weber, Esq.
Attorney for appellee
ORDER AND OPINION
(J. Sullivan)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the State’s appeal from an order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. After reviewing the briefs and record, this Court reverses the decision of the trial court.
Approximately 3:00 A.M. a police officer observed the defendant drifting out of his lane several times before reaching a bridge. The officer noticed that the defendant’s vehicle was being driven very, very slowly. The defendant was driving a Hummer, which is a large and wide vehicle. Upon reaching the bridge, which was under construction, the defendant drove over the double-yellow line substantially into the oncoming traffic lane. The officer testified the defendant’s left tires were completely over the double-yellow line the entire length of the bridge. There was, however, no traffic on the bridge at the time. Once the defendant crossed over the bridge, he proceeded to again drift back and forth between traffic lanes. When he crossed another bridge by again driving in the oncoming traffic lane, the officer believed he had seen enough and made a stop. The defendant was ultimately arrested for DUI. The defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the stop, claiming the stop was illegal. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the State is appealing that ruling.
The
officer was justified in making the stop for a variety of reasons. First, the
officer had an objective basis that the defendant was DUI. In Roberts v.
State, 732 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) the court held
that the defendant’s “continuous weaving, even if only within her lane, during
the time that she was being followed presented an objective basis for
suspecting that she was under the influence. Thus, the facts supported the
stop.” See also, Carillo v. State, 506 So.2d 495 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1987); State v. Bean, No. CRC 04-22 APANO (
Reviewing the
written order granting suppression, it is obvious that the trial court was
placing great emphasis on O’Connell v. State, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 3 (
Second, courts have consistently held that because of the inherent dangers of motor vehicle travel, the police may stop a vehicle even when there is no reasonable suspicion that the driver has, is, or is about to commit a crime. In fact, stops are permitted even though the driver has not even committed a traffic infraction. See Bailey v. State, 319 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1975)(because of the dangers inherent to our modern vehicular mode of life, the police may be justified in stopping a vehicle to determine the reason for its unusual operation); Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine if the driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior).
In the case at bar, the defendant’s driving was sufficiently unusual to justify a stop even if it could be said that the driving was not indicative of someone who was DUI. The defendant crossed over the double-yellow line, substantially into the oncoming traffic lane for the entire length of a bridge. It was only good fortune that there was no oncoming traffic. In fact, the officer testified that because the way the bridge was made, a driver would not always be in a position to see if there was any oncoming traffic --- particularly at night.
The defendant’s odd driving cannot be excused as simply a necessary adjustment for the construction taking place on the bridge. The officer testified that he has observed traffic on that bridge every day; and tractor trailers, dump trucks and both small and large vehicles do not normally navigate that bridge in that manner.
Even discounting the defendant’s driving over the double-yellow line while on the bridge --- accepting the explanation that due to the size of the Hummer and the existence of the construction it was necessary --- there is sufficient evidence of somewhat erratic driving unrelated to the bridge. The testimony was that the drifting occurred both before and after the bridge. The defendant appeared to be frequently drifting. Given the number of drifts over the relatively short distance, and given the fact that the officer had extra time to observe the defendant because of the very, very slow speed of the defendant, the officer had both sufficient time to observe the defendant’s driving pattern and sufficient reason to be concerned about the defendant’s driving pattern.
There were sufficient objective grounds for the officer to suspect the defendant was DUI. In addition, the defendant’s driving was sufficiently unusual to justify an investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Therefore, the stop was justified.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Order and Opinion.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers at
____________________________
David A. Demers
Circuit Judge
_____________________________
Robert J. Morris, Jr.
Circuit Judge
_____________________________
Irene S. Sullivan
Circuit Judge
cc: State Attorney
Judge Overton
Timothy Weaver, Esq.