Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to Review Quasi-Judicial Action, Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles: DRIVER’S LICENSES – Permanent revocation –
defendant’s plea agreement in separate criminal proceeding has no bearing on
Department’s revocation for four DUI convictions – application of laches or
estoppel has no application when permanent revocation was statutorily mandated
- Petition denied. Starr v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
No. 04-0076AP-88A (
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND
APPELLATE
DIVISION
MARK EDWARD STARR,
Petitioner,
vs. Appeal No. 04-0076AP-88B
UCN522004AP000076XXXXCV
STATE OF
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY
SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Response and the Reply. Upon
consideration of the same, the record and being otherwise fully advised, the
Court finds that the Petition must be denied as set forth below.
The Petitioner, Mark Edward
Starr (Starr), seeks review of the Order of License Revocation, Suspension, or
Cancellation, dated September 20, 2004, in which the Respondent, Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department), permanently revoked Starr’s
driver’s license following his fourth DUI conviction on January 2, 2002. In reviewing the Order and the administrative
action taken by the Department, this Court must determine whether Starr was
afforded procedural due process, whether the essential requirements of law were
observed, and whether the Department’s findings and judgment are supported by
competent substantial evidence. See
Vichich v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 799 So.2d
1069, 1073 (
The record shows that Starr
received his fourth DUI conviction on January 2, 2002. As set forth in the Department’s Order, the
three prior convictions were on April 2, 1981 (
Before this Court, Starr raises several arguments, including: the trial court’s ruling on January 2, 2002, should have been a final determination of his license revocation; the doctrine of laches should bar the permanent revocation of his license; that Starr’s plea on January 2, 2002, was entered into with the understanding that his license would be revoked for only 5 years; and, the decision of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So.2d 782 (Fla. 2003), declaring Chapter 98-223, amending Florida Statutes, § 322.271 and § 322.28, unconstitutional prohibits the permanent revocation of his driver’s license.
In addressing these issues, the Court finds that at the time of Starr’s conviction in 2002, Florida Statutes, § 322.28(2)(e), provided that the court shall permanently revoke the driver’s license of a person that has been convicted four times for DUI. (emphasis added). The trial court had no discretion but to permanently revoke Starr’s license. See Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Spells, 502 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)(stating that revocation periods must be strictly applied). However, as stated above, the trial court was unaware that it was Starr’s fourth DUI conviction and imposed a lesser sentence. While it is unclear why it took the Department almost three years to permanently revoke Starr’s license for four DUI convictions,[1] it nevertheless had the authority to revoke Starr’s license without notice regardless of the trial court’s ruling in 2002. See Fla. Stat., § 322.22; see also State, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Davis, 775 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(holding that the entry of Department’s order canceling driver’s license without prior notice did not violate due process clause). As explained by the First District Court of Appeal in State, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Gordon, 860 So.2d 469, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), “[a]ny bargain a defendant may strike in a plea agreement in a criminal case has no bearing on administrative consequences that flow from the defendant’s actions.”
Accordingly, the fact that Starr entered into a plea based on a sentence for a second DUI conviction, for which the Court notes he received the benefit of reduced fines and costs, does not preclude the Department from permanently revoking Starr’s license based on the four DUI convictions he actually has. Indeed, other than vaguely stating that there may be a concern regarding the Virginia DUI conviction, Starr does not dispute that he has four DUI convictions. The Court also finds that since permanent revocation was statutorily mandated, the application of laches or estoppel has no application in this case. See e.g. Branca v. City of Miramar, 643 So.2d 604, 607 (Fla. 1994)(estoppel cannot be applied against a governmental entity to accomplish an illegal result); see also Hagar, 581 So.2d at 216-17 (rejecting driver’s argument that the Department should be equitably estopped from revoking his license when the Department failed to list out-of-state traffic offenses on driving record transcript).
Lastly, the Court finds that
Critchfield has no application to this proceeding, as even under the
prior version of Florida Statutes, § 322.271(4)(1997), Starr would not have
been eligible for a hardship license until January 2007. The constitutional defect recognized in Critchfield,
has since been cured by the legislature when it reenacted the 1999 version of
the Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 2003.
Therefore, it is,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari is denied.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at
___________________________________
DAVID A. DEMERS
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
___________________________________
PETER RAMSBERGER
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
___________________________________
ANTHONY RONDOLINO
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
Copies furnished to:
Russell F. McLatchey, Esquire
Jason Helfant, Assist. General Counsel