IN
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF
THE STATE OF
APPELLATE
DIVISION
HAROLD
T. DELOREY, III,
Appellant,
vs.
CRC02-10328CFANO
STATE
OF
Appellee.
____________________________/
Opinion
filed: ________________
Appeal
from Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Judge
William H. Overton
David
R. Gemmer
Attorney
for Appellant
Susan
M. Mitchell
Assistant
State Attorney
Attorney
for Appellee
ORDER
AND OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s Order Denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. After reviewing the briefs and record, this Court affirms the trial court’s decision.
On
On denying the defendant’s Motion to Suppress, the trial court found that there was no traffic violation, per se. However the trial court found that there was evidence of two factual patterns before the court of the defendant’s driving. One was the swerve in a jerky motion, basically straddling the center line and the subsequent swerve in a jerky motion of almost hitting the curb. The trial court reasoned that the defendant’s unusual driving pattern and the officer’s testimony that he stopped the vehicle because he believed the person was either under the influence or had some medical problem was sufficient to find that the officer had a reasonable suspicion for the stop of the vehicle.
“Appellate review of a motion to suppress involves questions of both law and fact and the appellate court must make a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the
law
to the facts.” Rosenquist v. State,
769 So.2d 1051 (
The defendant argues that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. However, Officer Magnani’s observation of the defendant’s driving, even if it did not rise to the level of a traffic offense, did provide an objective basis to initiate a traffic stop. See Department of Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that in order to effect a valid traffic stop for DUI, an officer need only a founded or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Furthermore, after observing the defendant’s driving behavior, an investigatory stop by Officer Magnani was warranted to ascertain the defendant‘s welfare. See DeShong, 603 So.2d at 1352 (stating that a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior); see also Bailey v. State, 319 So.2d 22, 26 (Fla. 1975) (stating that because of the dangers inherent to our modern vehicular mode of life, there may be justification for the stopping of a vehicle by a patrolman to determine the reason for its operation).
Therefore, this Court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings that the officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. It is therefore
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the trial court’s Order Denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is affirmed.
DONE
AND ORDERED in Chambers at
________________________________
JOHN
A. SCHAEFER
Primary
Appellate
Circuit
Judge
_________________________________
W.
DOUGLAS BAIRD
Circuit
Judge
__________________________________
NANCY
MOATE LEY
Circuit
Judge
Copies furnished to:
Judge William H. Overton
David Gemmer
Attorney for Appellant
Susan M. Mitchell
Assistant State Attorney
Attorney for Appellee