IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
FRANCES HOWARD BOYCE,
vs. Appeal No. 04-00016AP-88B
HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,
BUREAU OF DRIVER IMPROVEMENT,
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the Motion for Rehearing, filed by the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department), in response to the Order Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, entered June 4, 2004. Upon consideration of the same, the record and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted and substitutes this Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the prior order. 
The Petitioner, Frances Howard
Boyce (Boyce), seeks review of the Order, in the form of a letter dated January
27, 2004, in which the Department ordered Boyce to install an ignition interlock
device on his vehicle as a result of being convicted of a DUI. In reviewing the Department’s order, this Court
must determine (1) whether procedural due process had been accorded, (2) whether
the essential requirements of law had been observed, and (3) whether the administrative
findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence.
See Vichich v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,
799 So.2d 1069, 1073 (
Boyce argues that the Department erred in requiring him to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle, as only the Court, pursuant to Florida Statutes, § 316.1937, has the authority to require that such a device be installed. However, the Court finds that Florida Statutes, § 316.193(2)(a)3., requires the mandatory placement of an ignition interlock device for a second DUI conviction. Further, the Florida Administrative Code, Rule 15A-9.004(1), adopting by the Department pursuant to legislative directive,  also provides that ignition interlock devices are mandatory when required pursuant to § 316.193. As it is undisputed that Boyce received his second DUI conviction after July 1, 2003,  the Department had no discretion but to require Boyce to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle. See e.g. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Gordon, 860 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)(explaining that when a driver’s license revocation is required by statute, revocation by Department is an mandatory administrative function); Simmons v. State, 767 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(holding that the Department, not the sentencing court, is authorized to revoke a defendant’s driver’s license if defendant is convicted of certain offenses). Therefore, it is,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Rehearing is granted and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at
DAVID A. DEMERS
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
Copies furnished to:
David R. Parry, Esquire
Heather Rose Cramer, Assist. General Counsel
 The Court notes that the Motion for Rehearing attached Boyce’s driving record which the Court did not have available for its consideration in granting the petition.
 See Fla. Stat. § 316.193(11)(stating that “[t]he Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation of the use of ignition interlock devices”).
 See Fla. Stat. § 316.193(2)(a)3.(stating that “[t]he installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003”).