Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Review Quasi-Judicial Action, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles:  DRIVER’S LICENSES – Actual Physical Control of Motor Vehicle – arrest affidavits, which included Petitioner’s self-incriminating statements, were not competent substantial evidence that Petitioner was in actual physical control of motor vehicle – self-incriminating statements made pre-arrest could not be used to establish probable cause that Petitioner was driving – Petition granted.  Barringer v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, No. 03-3057CI-88B (Fla. 6th Cir. App. Ct. Jan. 6, 2004).

 

 

 

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

APPELLATE DIVISION

 

JOSEPH JAMES BARRINGER,

                                    Petitioner,

 

vs.                                                                                               Appeal No. 03-3057CI-88B

                                                                                                   UCN522003CC003057XXCICI

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF

HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,

                                    Respondent.

____________________________________________/

 

 

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

            THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and the Response.  Upon consideration of the same, the record and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that the Petition must be granted as set forth below.

            The Petitioner, Joseph James Barringer (Barringer), seeks review of the Final Order of License Suspension, entered March 18, 2003, in which the hearing officer for the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department), concluded that Barringer’s driving privilege was properly suspended for a period of six months for driving under the influence (DUI).  In reviewing the Department’s order, this Court must determine (1) whether procedural due process had been accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of law had been observed, and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence.  See Vichich v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 799 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(setting forth the standard of review for administrative action taken by the Department).

            Barringer requested a formal review hearing following his license suspension.  Barringer’s attorney was present, but Barringer himself, nor any other witnesses, were present or were called.  The hearing officer admitted several documents into evidence, including the Uniform Traffic Citation issued to Barringer, the complaint arrest affidavit of Officer Losinski, the complaint arrest affidavit of Officer Lange, the field sobriety test form, and the Breath Test Result Affidavit.

            When asked by the hearing officer if he had any objections to these documents, Barringer’s attorney replied that he did not.  Barringer’s attorney then moved to set aside the license suspension on two grounds: (1) there was nothing in the reports before the hearing officer that Barringer was in actual physical control of the vehicle, and (2) there was not a 20-minute observation period before Barringer was administered the first breath test.  These motions were denied.  Barringer raises the same two issues in his Petition before this Court.

            The record shows that Officer Losinski and Officer Lange, both of the Largo Police Department, responded to a motor vehicle accident with injuries.  Officer Lange’s arrest affidavit states that Barringer was operating a 1998 Ford station wagon west bound in the curb lane on Ulmerton Road when he failed to slow at a red light and rear-ended the victim.  Barringer then fled the scene.  He was located a couple of miles away from the crash site and admitted to rear-ending the victim’s vehicle and fleeing the scene.  Officer Lange’s affidavit states that Barringer was charged with “leaving the scene with injury” at 9:18 a.m.

            Likewise, Officer Losinski’s arrest affidavit states that Barringer was involved in a traffic crash and fled the scene.  Barringer was located approximately ¾ of a mile north of the scene and Barringer admitted to driving the motor vehicle involved in the accident.  Officer Losinski conducted the DUI investigation.  Barringer failed all the field sobriety tests and was charged with DUI at 9:18 a.m.  Barringer was then taken to the Largo Police Department where the breath tests were administered.  The Breath Test Result Affidavit shows that Barringer’s blood alcohol level was .138 and .139, at 10:04 a.m. and 10:07 a.m., respectively, with the observation period beginning at 9:40 a.m.

            As to the first issue, the Court agrees with the Petitioner that the Final Order is not supported by competent substantial evidence.  Although the hearing officer was authorized to consider all of the documentation and reports submitted by the law enforcement officers, the arrest affidavits, which included Barringer’s self-incriminating statements, is not competent substantial evidence from which the hearing officer could determine that Officer Losinki and Officer Lange had probable cause to believe that Barringer was in actual physical control of the vehicle involved in the accident.  See Fisher v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1a (Fla. 4th Cir. App. Ct. Oct. 1, 2002)(finding that competent substantial evidence did not exist in the record upon which the hearing officer could find that the self-incriminating statements relied upon were pre-arrest, so that they could be used to establish probable cause that Fisher was driving); see also Janney v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 4a (Fla. 9th Cir. App. Ct. Sept. 24, 1998)(concluding that the record lacked competent substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding of probable cause where the charging affidavit failed to state the factual basis upon which the officer believed Janney to be the driver); Cato v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 267 (Fla. 4th Cir. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2001); Schuyten v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 5a (Fla. 9th Cir. App. Ct. Sept. 30, 1998); Fila v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 547a (Fla. 17th Cir. App. Ct. June 6, 2001).  Accordingly, the Court finds that it needn’t address the merits of the second issue.

           

            It is therefore,

            ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted and the Final Order is quashed.

            DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Clearwater, Pinellas County, Florida this ________ day of December 2003.

 

 

 

 

                                                                        ___________________________________

                                                                        DAVID A. DEMERS

                                                                        Circuit Judge, Appellate Division

 

 

 

 

Copies Furnished To:

Craig Epifanio, Esquire

2600 Martin Luther King St. N., Suite 302

St. Petersburg, FL  33704

 

Heather Rose Cramer, Assist. General Counsel

Fla. Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles

6801 Lake Worth Road, #230

Lake Worth, FL  33467

 

Bureau of Driver Improvement

2814 East Hillsborough Avenue

Tampa, FL  33610