IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
APPELLATE DIVISION

J. DARREY,

                        Appellant,

vs.                                                                                                Appeal No. 00-1224-CI-88A

                                                                                                   

JEFFREY A. LOY and BARBARA H. LOY, his wife,

                        Appellees.

____________________________________/

Opinion filed ________________________

Appeals from Final Judgment County Court, Civil Division, Pinellas County

The Honorable William B. Blackwood

George A. Routh, Esquire
904 Old Mill Pond Road
Palm Harbor, FL  34683
Attorney for Appellant

Thomas J. Donnelly, Esquire
1172 Brownell Street, Suite 1
Clearwater, FL  33756
Attorney for Appellee

ORDER AND OPINION

            THIS CAUSE came before the Court on appeal, filed by J. Darrey (Appellant), from an Amended Summary Judgment, entered January 18, 2000, in favor of Jeffrey A. Loy and Barbara H. Loy, his wife (Appellees).  The Amended Summary Judgment also denied the Appellant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement and Granting of Summary Judgment.  Upon review of the record and the briefs and being otherwise fully advised, this Court finds that the lower court did not err in entering the Amended Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellees.

            In entering the Amended Summary Judgment, the lower court found that the Appellant

(plaintiff below) was not a licensed contractor in the State of Florida; therefore, as a matter of law, he could not prevail in his cause of action against the Appellees.  See  Florida Statutes

 §489.128(2000)(stating that “as a matter of public policy, contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1990, and performed in full or in part by any contractor who fails to obtain or maintain a license in accordance with this part shall be unenforceable in law or in equity”).

The Appellant does not dispute the lower court’s findings, but rather argues that the lower court erred in not enforcing a settlement agreement purportedly entered into between the parties.  The Appellant asserts that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement, and so it is irrelevant whether the Appellant could have prevailed in his original cause of action.

            Although the Amended Summary Judgment gives no explanation for its denial of the Appellant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement, a review of the record reveals that the parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement.  See Bateski v. Ransom, 658 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(holding that a settlement agreement must be sufficiently specific and the parties must mutually agree on every essential element)(citations omitted).  The correspondence between the parties’ respective counsel during the negotiations shows that the parties did not establish a meeting of the minds nor did the parties mutual agree on every essential element.  See id. 

            The letters between counsel demonstrate that there was a disagreement on the proper disposition of the pending litigation.  The Appellant wanted to file a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, while the Appellees insisted that the Appellant sign a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, a Notice of Cancellation of Lis Pendens, and a Notice of Cancellation of Claim of Lien.  The letters indicate that an essential aspect of the settlement agreement was the manner in which the pending litigation would be disposed of.  As the Appellant did not meet its burden of establishing assent by the Appellee to a certain definitive proposition, the lower court did not err in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement. See Bateski, 658 So.2d at 631, 632 (finding that an essential term of the appellant’s proposition was the type of release to be given; also citing Williams v. Ingram, 605 So.2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)).

            Therefore, it is,

            ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Amended Summary Judgment is affirmed.  It is further

            ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Appellant’s Motion for Assessment of Attorney’s Fees and Costs is denied.  It is further

            ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Appellees’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is granted.  The lower court shall determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees due to the Appellees.  

            DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Clearwater, Pinellas County, Florida this 30th day of November 2000.

 

  ___________________________________
CHARLES W. COPE
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division

Copies Furnished To:

The Honorable William B. Blackwood

George A. Routh, Esquire
904 Old Mill Pond Road
Palm Harbor, FL  34683

Thomas J. Donnelly, Esquire
1172 Brownell Street, Suite I
Clearwater, FL  34616

Staff Attorney, Appellate Division